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Abstract 
A nation's prosperity depends largely on its ability to raise the level of its productivity.  The 
education level of its workforce, and how effectively the skills are used in the production 
processes, are considered important factors in this process. In this report we investigate 
the extent to which skills have contributed to recent productivity performance in the UK. 
We do this within a cross-country framework, where we compare the UK's productivity 
trajectories with those of other close competitors. We quantify the role played by different 
types of certified skills, both academic and vocational, taking account of the influence of 
other factors, such as capital investment and technological change. Furthermore, we 
assess the influence of intangible investments, usually excluded from published data and 
traditional growth studies. We use a wide range of data sources, and employ growth 
accounting and panel data econometric techniques. 
The study begins with a comprehensive review of the literature on the role of human 
capital in productivity and growth, from both a theoretical and empirical point of view 
(section 1). We then provide a description of aggregate productivity and employment 
trends in section 2. Section 3 contains detailed results of the growth accounting 
decomposition and Section 4 summarises the econometric analysis. Sections 5 and 6 
outline the key findings and conclusions emerging from this analysis. 
The main research questions addressed in this report are: 
• What have been the main sources of growth in the UK and other major economies 
since the recession? How have these differed relative to the previous periods? 
• What is the link between skills and productivity/growth? How have skills contributed 
to growth over recent years?   
• What is the contribution of different types of skills to growth? Where does the UK 
fare better and worse compared to international competitors? 
• What is the role of training and other intangible assets in explaining productivity and 
growth outcomes? Do they interact differently with different types of skilled workers? 
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Executive summary 
In this study, we estimate the contributions of skills to productivity growth in the UK. The 
report is divided into four sections: a literature review, descriptive analysis, growth 
accounting analysis and an econometric approach. 
Literature review 
Education and skills are important drivers of productivity. Higher levels of educational 
attainment and skills raise productivity directly by expanding an individual’s economic 
capabilities - enabling them to accomplish more difficult tasks and to address more 
complex problems. But education and skills are also argued to raise productivity through 
indirect mechanisms - facilitating technological diffusion and innovation which may enable 
a nation to move to a higher growth path. 
Growth accounting studies have found that changes in labour composition (i.e. skills 
improvements) have tended to directly account for around a fifth of the growth in 
average labour productivity in the UK over recent decades. This study updates 
previous analyses and confirms this.  
Various econometric studies have also confirmed the importance of skills and education 
for productivity growth. For example:  
• Holland et al. (2013) found that a 1 per cent rise in the share of the workforce with a 
university education raises the level of productivity by 0.2-0.5 per cent in the long-
run. 
• Evidence from the US suggests that skills play a key role in the effective use of 
ICTs (Bresnahan et al., 2002).  
• Brandenburg et al. (2007) find that innovation performance at firm level is enhanced 
by a combination of skills and R&D investments.  
Recent evidence has shown that economic success is determined by the availability of a 
broad set of skills developed at different levels, both in general and vocational education. 
As information and communication technologies become more widespread, vocational 
skills are increasingly more important for the effective use of these technologies (Mason et 
al., 2014). Vocational skills – deployed in conjunction with high-level skills -- can also make 
useful contributions to absorptive capacity, which firms require to make effective use of 
knowledge, ideas and technologies generated outside their own organisations. However 
the contribution of this type of skills is not uniform across countries; vocational skills tend 
to play a more important role in countries with a stronger base of apprenticeship training. 
The UK performs relatively well in terms of higher skills (bachelor’s degree and above), 
and there is ample evidence on the impact of higher skills. However, compared to other 
countries, the UK’s intermediate (practical, technical and occupational) skills are of more 
concern. There is also much less research into the extent to which these drive productivity 
growth.  
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Descriptive analysis 
In the period considered (2001– 2013), the percentage of UK employment with upper-
intermediate and lower-intermediate vocational qualifications remained at around 35%, but 
the proportion with low or no qualifications fell from 43% to around 30%, and the 
proportion with higher-level skills increased from around 20% to around 35%. For the UK, 
the stock of on-the-job training capital has been declining, or stagnating, since even before 
the financial crisis. 
Growth accounting analysis 
Growth accounting-based estimates seek to capture the direct effects of growth in 
measured skills on economic performance. While it is unable to account for any positive 
effects arising from the indirect effects of skills or from complementarities between skills 
and other production inputs, it allows us to examine how much of the observed rate of 
change of an economy or industry's output can be explained by the rate of change of the 
different inputs (broadly, labour quality and quantity, capital, and total factor productivity) 
over the same period. 
The contribution of labour composition (sometimes known as labour quality) has remained 
positive through the whole period analysed, indicating an on-going increase in the average 
skill level of the UK's employed population. In the run-up to the financial crisis, the up-
skilling of the UK's workforce accounted for around 20% of total labour productivity 
growth. During and after the crisis, overall growth in labour productivity was negative on 
average – largely because of declining total factor productivity -- but the contribution of 
skills continued to make a positive contribution (Figure 3.2). The implication of this finding 
is that labour productivity growth could have been even weaker in the UK in recent years 
had it not been for the significant up-skilling of the workforce. However this result needs to 
be treated with caution as a full assessment of changes in the contributions in a 
counterfactual scenario is beyond the scope of our research.  
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Figure 3.2. Growth contributions of labour, capital and productivity in United 
Kingdom (%), 2002-2013. 
 
Sources: Conference Board Total Economy Database (TED), UK LFS, EU LFS, own calculations. 
 
Looking at types of skills, the main story is of expansion in high-skilled employment over 
the time period studied. The higher-skilled group accounted for the largest 
contribution to labour productivity growth, both before and after the financial crisis. 
The contribution of upper-intermediate and lower-intermediate skills was positive up to 
2007 but negative thereafter; this was largely due to changes in labour composition. 
Econometric approach 
Econometric techniques (panel data analysis) look to regress the rate of growth in an 
economy on a variety of different determinants, including indicators of human capital. This 
allows a closer inspection of spillovers and interaction of capital and labour with other 
factors of production, not picked up by the growth accounting analysis. Key results to note 
are: 
• Training has a sizeable and significant effect on labour productivity across the 
countries studied between 1995 and 2010. A 10% increase in the total amount of 
training variable per employee would increase productivity by 2%.   
• The UK’s inputs (capital, labour, training etc.) generally seem to make similar 
contributions to productivity and output growth as in the other countries studied, 
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though hours worked seem to contribute less to output growth than in other 
countries and non-ICT capital provides a greater contribution. 
• Industries with greater skill intensity benefit disproportionately from growth in 
training capital. This implies that training has a greater return in industries with a 
greater proportion of highly qualified workers. However, training also seems to 
enhance the productivity benefits in those industries or countries with a larger 
proportion of upper-intermediate workers.  
• High-level academic skills have a larger positive influence on productivity in those 
industries where innovative property investment represents a higher share of output 
and those with higher ICT intensity. In these industries, upper-intermediate skills 
also make a positive contribution to productivity, but this is of lower magnitude than 
in the case of the high-skills, in line with expectations.  
• The presence of upper-intermediate skills has a stronger influence on productivity in 
those sectors with a higher intensity of non-ICT capital and training capital.  
• Taken together, these results imply that high-level and upper-intermediate skills 
have complementary functions in enhancing productivity – the former more 
important for industries with high ICT intensity, the latter more important for 
industries with high non-ICT intensity and where interacted with additional training 
investment. 
Overall, the econometric results suggest that having a highly skilled workforce (either with 
high-level or upper intermediate qualifications) is important when combined with 
investment in intangible assets such as training and innovative property. This is consistent 
with the idea that the use of information technology, which increasingly is associated with 
complementary investments in intangible assets, is relatively skill-intensive. Our results 
suggest that the skill bias of new technology carries over to the period directly following the 
crisis. However, the small sample sizes warn against drawing too firm conclusions and 
further work is required, especially including the ‘recovery’ period after the financial crisis. 
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1. Literature review 
1. 1 Introduction 
1.1.1 Aims and objectives 
There is a strong evidence base on the macroeconomic returns to investments in 
education and skills, with extensive reviews having previously been conducted by Sianesi 
and Van Reenen (2003), Garrett et al. (2010) and Holland et al. (2013) among others. 
However the research literature is growing continuously and there is a need for an up-to-
date assessment of both the theory and evidence.  
This literature review therefore has the following objectives: 
• to summarise the theoretical work on the links between skills and productivity 
• to provide an up-to-date summary of the empirical work on the links between skills 
and productivity 
• to summarise the existing evidence on the contribution made by skills to the UK’s 
recent productivity performance. 
Our empirical analysis will then build on these foundations by undertaking new research 
into the link between skills and productivity growth in comparative perspective.  
1.1.2 Approach 
The review takes a pragmatic or ‘realist’ approach (Pawson et al., 2004), seeking to distil 
the key points on each of the issues to be covered, and focusing on the most informative 
studies in each area, rather than attempting to review all of the available literature. It 
covers both theoretical and empirical studies published in the field of economics, and 
encompasses international studies, but relies on English language sources only.  
1.1.3 Structure 
The review begins in Section 1.2 by reviewing the latest estimates of the UK’s productivity 
performance. It then goes on in Section 1.3 to review the main theoretical frameworks 
which posit linkages between skills and productivity. Section 1.4 then outlines the main 
methods used to estimate the contribution of skills to productivity, while Section 1.5 gives 
an overview of the latest estimates of the contributions of skills to productivity under these 
different approaches. Section 1.6 reviews the evidence on the supply and utilisation of 
different types of skill in the UK. Section 1.7 concludes.  
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1.2. The UK’s Productivity Performance 
1.2.1 International comparisons of productivity  
Official estimates which compare the UK’s productivity performance with that of its major 
competitors in the G7 show that GDP per hour worked in the UK is on a par with that of 
Canada and around 15 percentage points higher than in Japan (ONS, 2014). However, 
these estimates indicate that productivity in the UK is around 10 percentage points lower 
than in Italy and 28-30 percentage points lower than in Germany, France and the US. The 
UK therefore performs rather poorly in international comparisons of productivity levels.  
The UK does, nevertheless, have a higher share of its working-age population in 
employment than is the case for Italy, France and the US. Figure 1.1 plots each nation’s 
level of productivity against its employment rate, showing that the UK is outperformed on 
both measures only by Germany.  
Figure 1.1: GDP per hour worked in G7 countries, 2012, indexed to UK 
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The UK’s relatively poor productivity performance is of long-standing, with data from Crafts 
(2012) and Broadberry and O’Mahony (2005) indicating that the United States’ current 
productivity leadership over the UK dates back to the 1950s, and that productivity in 
Germany and France has exceeded that in the UK since the 1970s. However the gap has 
not been constant over time. Productivity growth accelerated in the UK during the 1990s 
and 2000s and, as a result, the productivity gap narrowed with respect to the other G7 
nations, standing at no more than 4 percentage points in 2006 (ONS, 2014). The UK has 
fallen back since the mid-2000s, however, particularly in comparison with the US. 
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1.2.2 Productivity growth before and after the crisis 
 
Figure 1.2 shows annual growth in GDP per hour worked for the G7 countries over the 
period 1997-2013. The UK’s strong performance in the late 1990s and early 2000s is 
clearly apparent. GDP per hour grew at an average rate of 2.1% per annum in the UK from 
the mid-1990s to 2007, aided by a rapid rate of growth in TFP, ICT-capital deepening and 
increases in skill levels (see Van Reenen, 2013).  
 
Figure 1.2: GDP per hour worked in G7 countries (2007=100) 
 
Source: ONS (2014) 
In contrast, during the period 2007-2009, productivity decreased at an average rate of -
1.1% per annum, and during 2009-2013 growth averaged just 0.4% per annum. The 
combination of low productivity and high employment has been termed the ‘UK’s labour 
productivity puzzle’. However, as Figure 1.2 shows, the UK has not been the only country 
in Europe to experience slow productivity growth, with France and Germany also posting 
slower rates of growth in recent years than they had done in the period leading up to 
recession. The major contribution to the UK’s experience appears to have come from a 
decline in TFP growth (see Goodridge et al., 2014; Harris and Moffat, 2014; Riley et al., 
2014). Capital shallowing appears to have made a minor contribution, but changes in 
labour composition have contributed positively to productivity growth since 2007 (see 
Table 1.1 below). The implication is that productivity growth would have been even weaker 
in the UK in recent years had it not been for the continued up-skilling of the workforce.  
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Table 1.1: Productivity growth before and after the crisis 
 2000-2007 2007-2011 
Change in ln(GDP/hour) per annum 2.5% -0.5% 
Estimated contributions from growth accounting:   
Labour composition 0.2% 0.6% 
Capital deepening 1.1% 1.0% 
TFP growth 1.2% -2.1% 
 
Source: Goodridge et al. (2014: Table 1). 
 
1.3. The Role of Human Capital in Productivity Growth 
It has long been recognised that education and skills are important drivers of economic 
growth and productivity. Higher levels of educational attainment and skill raise productivity 
directly by expanding an individual’s economic capabilities - enabling them to accomplish 
more difficult tasks and to address more complex problems. But education and skills are 
also argued to raise productivity through indirect mechanisms - facilitating technological 
diffusion and innovation which may enable a nation to move to a higher growth path1. 
1.3.1 The role of human capital in the standard growth model 
The direct effects of human capital can be situated within the standard neo-classical 
growth model developed by Solow (1957). Within this framework, the output of the macro 
economy is viewed as a direct function of factor inputs - physical capital and labour - 
augmented by a residual termed 'total factor productivity' (TFP) or disembodied technical 
progress: the efficiency by which both labour and capital are used in the production 
process. Output (Y) can be improved by: increasing the amount or quality of labour inputs 
(L); increasing the amount or quality of physical capital available per worker (K); or by 
raising TFP (A).  
𝑌𝑌 = 𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝛽𝛽     (1) 
Under the assumption of constant returns to scale we would have  𝛽𝛽 = 1 − 𝛼𝛼 
From the point of view of measurement, the earliest work under this framework utilised 
simple measures of the size of the population or labour force to proxy labour inputs, but 
improvements in the measurement of labour inputs led to L being measured as an index 
comprising both a quantity component (e.g. hours worked) and a quality component (e.g. 
proxied by wages) (see Jorgenson, 1991, for a discussion). Expressing the variables in 
terms of 'per unit of labour input', and taking logs, equation 1 can then be expressed as: ln �𝑌𝑌
𝐿𝐿
� = ln𝐴𝐴 + 𝛼𝛼 ln �𝐾𝐾
𝐿𝐿
� + 𝛽𝛽 ln �𝐻𝐻
𝐿𝐿
�   (2) 
where H is the measure of labour quality.  
1 Investment in human capital may also have other, broader social impacts, e.g. by improving health 
or reducing crime. These may have indirect, positive effects on growth in the medium to long-term. 
However such broader returns are beyond the scope of this review. 
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Variations on this approach have involved disaggregating L into different types of labour 
(e.g. workers with different levels of educational attainment), or treating it as a three-factor 
production process in which human capital (e.g. measured by educational attainment) is 
entered separately from the quantity of labour inputs and the output-elasticity is allowed to 
differ across the two inputs (e.g. Mankiw et al., 1992).  
Whatever the precise specification, this neo-classical or 'standard' growth model proposes 
that a country with higher quality labour (a greater stock of human capital) should have 
larger national output per unit of labour input than an otherwise identical country with lower 
quality labour. However, investments in physical or human capital do not raise the long-
term growth rate; instead they create a short-term increase in the growth rate (e.g. as new 
graduates replace less-educated retirees) until a new steady state is reached. In other 
words, the rate of technological progress is assumed to be exogenous to the model. This 
assumption is challenged within new 'endogenous' theories of growth. 
1.3.2. The role of human capital in endogenous theories of growth 
Whilst the standard model of growth focuses implicitly on the direct effects of increasing a 
nation's stock of human capital, it is also recognised that there may be additional, indirect 
effects from education, such that the long-term growth rate of TFP is itself a function of the 
level of education or human capital in the economy. Following the notation used in 
equations 1 and 2 above: ln �𝑌𝑌
𝐿𝐿
� = ln𝐴𝐴(𝐻𝐻,𝑍𝑍) + 𝛼𝛼 ln �𝐾𝐾
𝐿𝐿
� + 𝛽𝛽 ln �𝐻𝐻
𝐿𝐿
�   (3) 
where Z is a vector of variables (such as R&D expenditure or the degree of openness of 
the economy) which, along with H, may affect the rate of technical progress. Under this 
approach, A is then no longer considered to be exogenous.  
A number of different models have been developed to illustrate the possible mechanisms 
through which human capital may affect the long-run growth rate of the economy, as well 
as the level. In the model of economic growth and human capital developed by Lucas 
(1988), the accumulation of human capital generates spillovers as educated workers pass 
on their knowledge to other workers.2 In other models, human capital accumulation 
promotes investments in physical capital (Romer, 1986) or it promotes investments in 
research and development (R&D) (Romer, 1990)3. Other macro models (e.g. Nelson and 
Phelps, 1966; Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994, 2005) also argue that education and skills 
serve as facilitators for technological diffusion, with positive effects on growth. The 
presumption within many of these approaches is that an educated labour force is better at 
creating, implementing, and adopting new technologies, thereby generating growth. These 
2 Such spillovers may explain why increased education levels in an area are correlated with higher earnings 
for locals with relatively little education (Winters, 2015). 
3 Evidence for the complementarities between human capital and new technology is found inter alia in 
the literature on skill-biased technical change (e.g. Machin and Van Reenen, 1998). Green and 
Mason (2015) provide an overview of the literature on the complementarities between skills and 
innovation. 
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models therefore emphasise the indirect effects of education and skills in moving a country 
to a higher growth path.  
As in the standard growth models, attention has also been paid to the returns that may be 
generated by different types of labour. In particular, Acemoglu et al. (2006) and 
Vandenbussche et al. (2006) argue that the creation of new technologies (innovation) and 
their subsequent adoption (diffusion) require different types of skill. Specifically, innovation 
is argued to make intensive use of highly-educated workers, while diffusion of technology 
primarily through imitation is argued to rely more on less-highly educated labour. 
Innovation is argued to become more important as countries move closer to the 
technology frontier, and so the implication for developed countries such as the UK is that 
greater emphasis needs to be placed on high-level skills in order to generate growth.  
1.4. Methods for Estimating the Contribution of Skills to Productivity 
Growth  
The various models set out in the previous section have each been applied in seeking to 
estimate the contribution of skills to economic growth, and each has received support from 
the data. In other words, there is evidence under either framework that education and skills 
make a positive contribution to growth. At the same time, however, it is difficult to compare 
the alternative models and to choose among them. First, each requires a different 
empirical specification for the analysis; and second, there is insufficient variation among 
countries offering good quality data to distinguish categorically between the competing 
models. As a consequence, there remains no categorical view as to the relative 
importance of the various direct and indirect channels - a number of different channels are 
thus seen to be important. The evidence is reviewed in the next section of the report; here 
we give a broad overview of the methods used in empirical studies.  
Empirical analysis of the contribution of skills to growth takes two broad forms: growth 
accounting; and econometric approaches. The OECD Productivity Measurement Manual 
(OECD, 2009) notes that the two approaches are complementary, advocating growth 
accounting as the recommended tool for periodic productivity statistics, but recommending 
econometric methods as the best approach for academically-oriented hypothesis testing. 
Growth accounting-based estimates seek to capture the direct effects of growth in 
measured skills on economic performance. This non-parametric technique does so by 
allowing us to examine how much of the observed rate of change of an economy or 
industry's output over a specified period can be explained by the rate of change of the 
different inputs over the same period (see Jorgenson et al., 1987). Growth is then 
allocated to those parts explained by changes in labour inputs, capital inputs and TFP. It is 
then possible to identify the relative importance of changes in labour quality as a direct 
source of labour productivity growth.4 However the growth accounting methodology has 
the disadvantage that it is unable to account for any positive effects arising from the 
indirect effects of skills or from complementarities between skills and other production 
inputs. It also relies on restrictive assumptions, such as constant returns to scale.  
4 As such, they are firmly rooted in the neo-classical model.  
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Econometric approaches seek to regress the rate of growth in an economy (or economies) 
on a variety of different determinants, including indicators of human capital. Such 
approaches allow for non-constant returns to scale, and allow for the specification of 
interaction effects between the inputs and other determinants. There are important choices 
to be made when specifying such regressions, such as how to address endogeneity 
(Sianesi and Van Reenen, 2003: 164-171)5. However, such methods are better placed 
than growth accounting to identify the indirect effects of skills, as they are better able to 
indicate the mechanisms through which skills may affect growth. 
A critical issue which affects both methodologies is the measurement of skills. Within the 
growth-accounting approach, labour quality is typically measured through an index of 
quality-adjusted labour inputs. Here, the hours contributed by workers in a particular skill 
group are weighted by a factor proportional to the ratio of the average wage earned by 
workers in that skill group to the average wage earned by workers within the lowest skill 
group. The sum is then taken across all skill groups and divided by the total number of 
hours worked in the economy to obtain the country measure of quality-adjusted labour per 
unit of hours worked. Such an approach necessarily relies on the availability of skill 
category measures that are consistent over time and comparable across countries, which 
in turn requires the approach typically to utilise broad skill categorisations focused on 
educational qualification groups. The approach also assumes that workers are paid their 
marginal product (that wage differentials reflect true productivity differences between 
workers, rather than other institutional factors). This is in accordance with the assumption 
of competitive factor markets. 
Econometric methods may also use such measures of 'quality-adjusted labour inputs', but 
they also employ a much wider range of indicators. Studies involving large numbers of 
countries have to rely on simple measures such as the average number of years of 
schooling, particularly when estimating cross-country models that include developing 
countries where other data is sparse. Other measures used include monetary investments, 
qualification attainments and standardised test scores. The variety of measures used in 
econometric analyses is helpful in bearing down on the components of human capital, but 
also in pointing to the potential role of policy interventions.  
The fact that the growth accounting and econometric approaches differ means that the 
results of the two approaches are not directly comparable. The growth accounting 
approach focuses on the relative contribution of different inputs and TFP in accounting for 
growth in retrospect, whereas the econometric approaches attempt to identify the causal 
impact of particular factors on growth. However, as noted above, taking the different 
studies together, there is compelling evidence that increasing human capital raises 
productivity. This evidence is reviewed in the next section. 
1.5. Evidence on the Contribution of Skills to Productivity Growth  
This section first presents an overview of recent growth accounting estimates before 
moving on to discuss the results of recent econometric analyses. Issues relating to the 
5 Endogeneity is a problem as output and inputs are usually subject to similar influences.  
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measurement of skills, and to the identification of the different channels through which 
skills may affect productivity, are highlighted in the course of the discussion. 
1.5.1 Growth accounting estimates 
Growth accounting estimates have tended to find that changes in labour composition can 
account for around 15-20% of the growth in average labour productivity in the UK over 
recent decades. However, estimates vary according to the sample period and the 
measures of skill that are utilised in the analyses. 
Van Reenen (2013) and Holland et al. (2013) have both used EUKLEMS data to 
undertake growth accounting analyses of the contribution made by changes in labour 
composition to productivity growth over the past three decades. Both split the time period 
in two, although using slightly different start, break and end points, and both employ the 
basic three-category skill grouping available in EUKLEMS6. Their estimates cover the 
years prior to the recent recession. The estimates differ considerably for the period leading 
up to the mid-1990s, but for the decade from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s they both 
estimate that changes in labour quality accounted for around one sixth of the overall 
growth of productivity (Table 1.2).  
The contribution from changes in labour composition can be attributed to increases in the 
shares of the workforce with secondary and tertiary education, and a corresponding 
decline in the share of those with only primary education. Holland et al. (2013) show that 
the contribution from tertiary education was similar to that of secondary education over the 
period 1982-1993, but that the contribution of tertiary education was around three times 
higher than that of secondary education in the later period 1994-2005. 
Table 1.2: Growth accounting estimates of labour productivity growth in the UK. 
 
Time 
period 
Skill 
groups 
ALP 
growth 
per 
annum 
Shares due to: 
Labour 
composition 
Capital 
deepening TFP 
Holland et al. (2013) 1982-1993 Three 2.7 ppts 22% 56% 22% 
 1994-2005 Three 2.5 ppts 16% 56% 24% 
Van Reenen (2013) 1979-1997 Three 2.7 ppts 11% 48% 41% 
 1997-2007 Three 2.8 ppts 18% 46% 36% 
Mason et al. (2014) 1981-1989 Five 2.4 ppts 17% 21% 58% 
 1990-1998 Five 2.4 ppts 17% 33% 46% 
 1999-2007 Five 2.2 ppts 18% 32% 50% 
 1981-2007 Five 2.3 ppts 17% 30% 53% 
O'Mahony (2012a) 2001-2007 Three 
+ 
training 
1.9 ppts 24% 51% 26% 
 
Note: Shares may not sum to 100% due to rounding.  
 
6 High-skilled (tertiary education), medium-skilled (secondary education) and low-skilled (primary 
education). See Timmer et al. (2007). 
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The estimates from Van Reenen (2013) and Holland et al. (2013) focus primarily on the 
contribution of educational qualifications. However Mason et al. (2014) develop a five-
category skills measure which provides a more detailed view of the role of intermediate 
vocational skills. Their estimates cover the period 1981-2007 and suggest that changes in 
labour quality account for 18 per cent of the growth in labour productivity over the whole 
period: an estimate that is stable across sub-periods (Table 1.2). Intermediate vocational 
qualifications contribute positively in the 1980s, in particular, but as in the analysis by 
Holland et al., it is higher-level skills which contribute most in recent years. 
O'Mahony (2012a) goes further by adding a measure of workforce training provided by 
employers to the index of labour quality, thereby expanding the indicator to include a 
measure of uncertified skills. The difficulties of expanding the measure in this way, 
however, mean that O'Mahony's estimates only cover the period 2001-2007. Her 
estimates indicate that around one quarter of productivity growth in the UK over this period 
can be attributed to improvements in labour quality (Table 1.3). Training investments 
account for around one sixth of this contribution in the UK, with the more 'traditional' 
measure of labour composition accounting for the remaining five-sixths.  
 
Each of the growth accounting approaches discussed above includes cross-country 
comparisons, and so it is also possible to identify the relative contribution of skills to 
productivity growth in the UK when compared with some of its close competitors. Mason et 
al.’s estimates for the period 1981-2007 indicate that improvements in labour quality were 
of relatively greater importance in the UK than in France or Germany, where greater 
shares of productivity growth can be attributed to capital deepening (Figure 1.3). Up-
skilling was also of greater importance in the UK than in Sweden, where TFP growth was 
particularly strong. In Mason et al.’s comparisons, the contribution of skills in the UK was 
on a par with that seen in Denmark and the Netherlands.  
 
Figure 1.3: Average contributions of growth in physical capital per hour worked, 
TFP and skills to growth in output per person-hour, 1981-2007. 
 
Source: Mason et al. (2014: Figure 5) 
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O’Mahony’s estimates for the period 2001-2007 which, as noted above, use an expanded 
index of labour quality including training, show a similar picture. Here the contribution of 
human capital investments to productivity growth is comparatively strong in the UK when 
compared with France and Germany, for example (Table 1.3). 
 
Table 1.3: Contributions of labour composition and training to productivity growth, 
2001-2007. 
 
Labour 
composition Training Total 
Austria (AT) 9% 1% 10% 
Belgium (BE) 12% 1% 13% 
Germany (DE) 4% 2% 6% 
Denmark (DK) -7% 14% 8% 
Spain (ES) 26% 6% 32% 
Finland (FI) 11% 4% 14% 
France (FR) 14% 5% 19% 
Italy (IT) 15% 2% 17% 
Netherlands (NL) 20% 9% 28% 
United Kingdom 
(UK) 20% 4% 24% 
 
Source: Adapted from O’Mahony (2012a: Table 8) 
 
Finally, an insight into the relative contribution of different levels of skill across countries is 
provided by Mason et al. (2014). They show that higher-level skills were the main driver of 
productivity growth in the UK over the period 1981-2007, with a relative contribution (vis a 
vis intermediate skills) that was only exceeded in Germany. 
 
Figure 1.4: Skill group shares of total higher and intermediate skills contributions to 
growth in output per person-hour, 1981-2007. 
 
Source: Mason et al. (2014: Figure 6). 
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In summary, growth accounting estimates indicate that just under one fifth of recent 
productivity growth in the UK can be accounted for by improvements in skill levels, rising to 
around one quarter when the indicator of labour quality is augmented with a measure of 
workforce training. The contribution of human capital investments to productivity growth 
has been strong in the UK relative to many of its competitors. High-level skills appear to 
have played a particularly important role when compared with the experience of other 
large European countries.  
1.5.2 Econometric estimates 
Section 1.4 noted that the empirical literature which utilises econometric methodologies is 
better placed than the growth accounting literature to quantify the broader returns to 
education beyond the direct effects on the productivity of individual employees.  Sianesi 
and Van Reenen (2003) provided a comprehensive survey of early empirical studies, and 
Holland et al. (2013) provide a more recent review. In both surveys, the econometric 
evidence is supportive of the conclusion that human capital has a positive and significant 
effect on productivity. The particular value of the econometric studies, however, is in being 
able to utilise a wider variety of measures of human capital than is possible under the 
growth accounting approach, and thus to point towards some of the mechanisms through 
which human capital raises productivity.  
The econometric estimates typically come in three forms: cross-country regressions which 
seek to explain variations in nations’ performance; studies which seek to exploit time-
series variation for a single country; and industry-level regressions which are able to 
control for country-specific fixed effects. We review some of the main results below, 
organising the discussion around the main measures of human capital that have been 
used in the literature.  
1.5.2.1. Educational participation 
Measures of educational participation have been available for a large number of countries 
for at least two decades, and these have facilitated a large body of research on the 
relationship between years of schooling and productivity. Summarising the early evidence, 
Sianesi and Van Reenen (2003) noted that studies taking a neo-classical approach 
typically found that a one-year increase in the average number of years of schooling in a 
country was associated with a 3-6 per cent increase in the level of output per head. 
Studies situated in the endogenous growth literature typically found that a one-year 
increase in years of schooling was associated with a 1 per cent increase in the growth rate 
of productivity, although it is doubtful that such a result would pertain in developed 
countries (see Sianesi and Van Reenen, 2003: 188; also Krueger and Lindahl, 2001). 
Whilst such measures of educational participation have the advantage of being available 
for the largest number of countries and time points, they have notable disadvantages. 
First, they assume that school attendance is a good proxy for the acquisition of knowledge. 
Second, they assume that each additional year of schooling delivers the same increase in 
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knowledge and skills regardless of the starting point.7 Third, they also assume that all 
national school systems are of equal quality.  
Some recent studies have used improved measures of years of schooling that allow for 
differential returns from primary, secondary and tertiary education. Barro and Lee’s (2010) 
estimates for a sample of 127 countries suggest that the return to every additional year of 
schooling is 10 per cent at the secondary level and 18 per cent at the tertiary level.8 The 
limitation remains, however, that such estimates are based on measures of educational 
inputs rather than measures of attainment.  
1.5.2.2 Monetary investments 
In a similar vein to the literature on years of schooling, Keller (2006) examines the impact 
of educational expenditure as a determinant of productivity. She measures expenditures 
on public education at primary, secondary and tertiary level and finds that developed 
countries that have spent a greater share of their GDP on secondary education have seen 
faster per-capita growth, although her results are sensitive to the precise specification of 
her model.  
One potential difficulty with cross-country estimates of the influence of education spending, 
however, is its potential endogeneity with respect to measures of a nation’s productivity 
and growth. This issue is addressed directly by Aghion et al. (2009) who examine the link 
between education spending and per-capita growth within the US. They use a series of 
political instruments (e.g. the arrival of vacancies on legislative committees at federal and 
state level) to cause arbitrary variation in educational spending and find that exogenous 
shocks to investments in four-year college education generate per-capita growth in all US 
states. In contrast, they do not find any returns from investments in two-year college 
education. Investments in research-intensive universities9 are found to raise per-capita 
growth in states fairly close to the technological frontier, suggesting that innovation is an 
important means through which education spending can raise growth. We return to this 
subject in Section 1.2.5.6.  
1.5.2.3 Educational attainments  
Moving from measures of educational inputs to measures of outputs, a number of studies 
have examined the links between educational attainments and productivity growth. 
Measures of attainment based on qualifications have the advantage of being better able to 
capture what has actually been learned, and so are preferable to measures of 
participation. However, they have the accompanying disadvantage of being hard to 
compare across countries with different education systems, and so studies based on 
comparable measures of qualifications attainments tend to use more limited samples of 
countries than the studies mentioned hitherto.  
7 In other words, the associated returns are assumed to be linear throughout the various levels of the 
education system. 
8 Barro and Lee do not give level-specific returns for different regions. But they find an average rate of 
return of around 8 per cent from each additional year of schooling in Europe and Central Asia, 
compared with an average rate of return of around 12 per cent in their full sample. 
9  Spending on research-intensive universities covers expenditures of post-secondary institutions that 
fit into one of the following categories of the Carnegie Classification: “Research 1”, “Research  2”, 
“Doctoral 1”, “Doctoral 2” (see Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching (2005)). 
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Mason et al. (2012) use direct measures of qualifications attainments in an industry-level 
study of productivity across five countries (UK, US, France, Germany and the Netherlands) 
for the period 1979-2000. In GMM estimations they find that a 1 per cent increase in the 
proportion of hours worked by persons with a degree-level qualification increases average 
labour productivity by 0.12 per cent (p.355).10 Degree-level qualifications are also found to 
be positively associated with rates of TFP growth, albeit only in graduate-intensive 
industries (p.358). In contrast, they find no effects from intermediate-level skills (technician 
and craft-level qualifications).  
Holland et al. (2013) go on to examine the influence of degree-level qualifications in a 15-
country study covering the period 1982-2005. Using a similar specification to that used by 
Mason et al. (2012), they find that a 1 per cent rise in the share of the workforce with a 
university education raises the level of productivity by 0.2-0.5 per cent in the long-run. 
Their estimates suggest that at least one-third of the UK’s productivity growth from 1994-
2005 can be attributed to the substantial accumulation of graduate skills in the labour force 
over that period (p.61). 
Neither of these studies is concerned with the timing of the attainment: that is, whether the 
qualification was attained during the traditional years of schooling or later in life. However 
this issue is investigated directly by Dorsett et al. (2010, 2011). Their studies, which use 
the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), are limited to an individual-level examination 
of wage returns and employment probabilities. They find that, for men, a qualification 
attained after the age of 25 raises wages by around 9 per cent in cases where the new 
qualification is at a higher level than their previous attainment, and between 2-6 per cent 
where it does not (Dorsett et al., 2010). For women, the effects are roughly doubled 
(Dorsett et al. 2011).11 These results suggest that lifelong learning can raise an 
individual’s productivity, particularly where it involves a new, higher level of educational 
attainment to that obtained during traditional schooling.  
1.5.2.4. Uncertified skills 
Some of the qualifications considered by Dorsett et al. (2010, 2011) may have been 
acquired in the course of a person’s employment, but a more complete assessment of 
workplace-based skill acquisition would also include the role of uncertified skills acquired 
through training. Mason et al. (2012) incorporate the role of uncertified skill by developing 
quality-adjusted skill measures similar to those used in growth accounting studies. They 
combine measures of formal qualifications with relative earnings data in order to capture 
differences in relative productivity between different groups, with the assumption that these 
wage differentials will reflect productivity differences arising from the possession of both 
uncertified and certified skills. They use this measure in the five-country study cited in 
Section 1.5.2.3 above and find that a 1 per cent increase in their measure raises average 
labour productivity by 0.3 per cent. Comparison with the results obtained from their 
measure of qualifications attainment, discussed earlier, suggests a stronger role for human 
capital when taking uncertified skills into account. 
10 Generalised Methods of Moments is an instrumental variable econometric technique. 
11 There are additional effects on the probability of employment, which are substantial for women, and 
for men who experience qualifications upgrading, but negligible for men who do not. 
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In a further investigation of the role of training, Mason et al. (2014) add to their growth 
accounting analyses, discussed in Section 1.5.1 by conducting an econometric analysis 
that seeks to explain the level of GDP per hour through reference to the shares of workers 
with certified skills at five different skill levels (higher, upper-intermediate vocational, lower-
intermediate vocational and lower-intermediate general), along with measures of the 
average training capital per hour worked for high-skilled and intermediate-skilled 
workers.12 Their estimates show that there are significant interaction effects between 
training capital and the shares of workers at both high-skilled level and at upper-
intermediate level. This suggests that the positive impact of higher-level certified skills is 
reinforced by uncertified skills developed through employer investments in job-related 
training. In a related study O’Mahony and Riley (2012), using data for the European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP) show that spillovers from higher education are 
significant and greater when combined with employer provided training. 
1.5.2.5 Internationally standardised measures of cognitive skills 
As noted above, measures of qualifications and uncertified skills move us closer to a 
measure of the actual skill level (or human capital) that serves as an input to the 
production process, but the use of such indicators is inevitably limited by the difficulties of 
obtaining comparable indicators across countries with different education systems. A 
recent response to this problem has been the development of internationally-standardised 
data on cognitive skills.  
Hanushek and Woessmann (2012) use data from a series of international tests of the 
maths and science skills of secondary school children from 50 countries over the period 
1960-2000. Adopting an endogenous growth framework, they find that a one standard 
deviation improvement in test scores is associated with a 1.2-2.0 percentage points higher 
average annual growth rate in GDP per capita across their full sample. The effect is 
apparent in a restricted sample of developed countries, and the impact appears to have 
grown stronger in the second half of their estimation period. Notably, their analysis also 
shows a complementarity between the development of basic skills and the development of 
the higher-level skills which have tended to be the focus of much recent work based on 
measures of qualifications. Separate simulations by Hanushek and Woessmann suggest 
that raising the UK’s average score by around one-quarter of a standard deviation, such 
that it reached the attainment of Finland, would increase long-run growth by 0.49 
percentage points (OECD, 2010: 25); a similar return would be obtained by eliminating the 
tail of low achievement in the UK, such that all students obtained a minimum of 400 points 
on PISA (ibid.: 26).  
There are, to our knowledge, no similar papers (as yet) which seek to explain cross-
country variation in growth or productivity using the results of the OECD’s more recent 
Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC). However, 
there have been some initial assessments of wage returns using these data. Using a 
sample of PIAAC data from 22 countries, Hanushek et al. (2013) show that a one standard 
deviation increase in numeracy skills is associated with an 18 percentage point increase in 
wages at the individual level. In single-country specifications focusing solely on the UK, 
however, literacy and problem-solving skills appear to be at least as important in providing 
12 The methodology for computing training capital follows that used by O’Mahony (2012a, 2012b). 
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wage returns for individuals (ibid.: Table A-3). Clearly this will be an area of further 
research in the future. 
1.2.5.6 Indirect effects and spillovers 
The preceding sections discuss the literature which seeks to identify the links between 
skills and productivity levels or growth rates, taking some account of the possible indirect 
effects. However the discussion touches only fleetingly on the mechanisms by which these 
indirect effects may take place. As noted in Section 1.3, the main mechanisms that are 
judged to be relevant are the role of skills in facilitating technological diffusion and their 
role in promoting innovation. As a means of adding to the discussion, we finish this section 
of the review by providing a brief summary of some of the evidence in these regards.  
In respect of technological diffusion, evidence from the US suggests that skills play a key 
role in the effective use of ICTs (Bresnahan et al., 2002), while studies in a number of 
European countries have also provided evidence of a complementary relationship between 
workforce education or skills and the adoption of new technologies (e.g. Bayo-Moriones 
and Lera-López, 2007; Hollenstein, 2004). These studies support the proposition that 
higher-skilled workers facilitate the selection, installation, operation and maintenance of 
ICTs and also their adaptation to firm-specific requirements. This positive relationship 
between education or skill levels and ICT adoption also holds in cross-country studies 
involving European and other industrial nations (e.g. Gust and Marquez, 2004). 
Turning to the role of skills in facilitating innovation, Brandenburg et al. (2007) find, in a 
sample of European firms, that innovation performance at firm level is enhanced by a 
combination of skills and R&D investments, whilst Griffith et al.’s (2004) cross-country, 
sector-level analysis found that R&D spending and high-level skills helped to stimulate 
productivity growth via their combined effects on innovation. Other evidence suggests that 
one of the key mechanisms here involves knowledge transfer among skilled workers: 
either through supply-chain collaboration on R&D and technical problem-solving (Lundvall, 
1992) or through the mobility of highly-qualified engineers and scientists between firms 
(Mason et al., 2004). 
Sena and Añon Higon (2014) provide further evidence that the impact of skills on 
innovation may spread (or ‘spill over’) beyond specific firms or industries, showing that the 
local density of human capital facilitates the absorption of R&D spillovers. They develop a 
quality-adjusted labour index in industry-by-region cells within the UK and use this to 
identify locations where the educational attainment of workers in a given industry are either 
closer to, or further away from, the industry maximum across all regions. When linked with 
firm-level data on productivity and R&D, this shows that plants located in regions where 
the educational attainment of the workforce in an industry is closer to the frontier tend to 
have faster absorption of R&D spillovers from other industries and experience an increase 
in productivity.  
1.6. The Related Role of Intangible Assets in Economic Growth 
The previous sections of this review have focused on human capital which by their nature 
is an intangible asset. Thus, there is an obvious overlap with the growing literature on the 
role of broader categories of intangible assets in economic growth. There are a variety of 
ways in which the research literature has defined intangible assets, but they are typically 
defined to include: digitized information (software and databases); innovative property 
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(R&D); and economic competences or organisational assets (brand names, firm-specific 
human capital, and management capabilities) (see, for example, Corrado et al., 2005). 
Intangible capital is thus knowledge-based capital to a large extent, although the non-
certified and non-visible nature of this knowledge makes it difficult to measure.  
One approach to measurement has been to identify the shares of workers involved in the 
creation of each type of intangible capital (see Riley and Robinson, 2011). Another has 
been to focus on specific types of intangible capital, such as management capabilities 
(Bloom et al., 2014). However, more comprehensive attempts have recently been made to 
build up estimates of the stock of intangible capital (see Dal Borgo et al., 2013; Corrado et 
al., 2012; Niebel et al., 2013). 
Dal Borgo et al. (2013) use their measure of intangible capital in growth accounting 
estimates of productivity growth in the UK over the period 1990-2008. They find that 
intangible assets account for just under one quarter (23 per cent) of UK productivity growth 
over the period 2000-2008, with the majority of this contribution formerly being assigned to 
TFP. There is an accompanying reduction in the contribution of labour composition but it is 
small: the share of productivity growth that is accounted for by changes in labour 
composition falls from 9 per cent to 7 per cent in the period 2000-2008 after the inclusion 
of intangible capital.  
Corrado et al. (2012) develop a measure of intangible capital for the EU-27 plus Norway 
and the United States. In growth accounting estimates, they find that intangibles account 
for 24 per cent of UK productivity growth over the period 1995-2007, with changes in 
labour composition accounting for a further 14 per cent. Their cross-country data facilitate 
international comparisons, which show that the UK contributions from intangibles and 
labour composition are larger than seen in the EU as a whole, but on a par with estimates 
for the US.  
Finally, Niebel et al. (2013) use similar data to that used by Corrado et al. and conduct 
both growth accounting and econometric analysis at the industry level covering 10 
European countries over the period 1995-2007. Their growth accounting estimates 
suggest that intangible capital accounted for 16% of productivity growth in these countries 
over the period, but this fraction rises to 27% within their econometric analysis. This result 
suggests that further investigation is needed of the potential spillovers arising from 
investment in intangible assets. 
1.7. Skills Supply and Utilisation in Comparative Perspective 
In the final section of this review, we switch from a focus on the impact of skills on 
productivity to look at the UK’s comparative position in terms of the supply and utilisation 
of skills within the economy. The preceding discussion has indicated that the expansion of 
higher education in the UK has been an important positive influence on productivity 
growth, and, more broadly, that high-level cognitive skills are an important source of 
growth in developed countries such as the UK. We therefore examine how levels of skills 
supply and utilisation in the UK currently compare with those found in other developed 
countries. In doing so, we look at measures of educational participation and qualifications, 
at internationally-standardised test scores and also at broader measures of human capital 
which account for training investments and other forms of uncertified skill. 
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1.7.1 Educational participation and qualifications 
The OECD ranks countries according to the shares of the 25-64 year old population with 
low-level skills (below upper secondary education), intermediate level skills (upper 
secondary) and high-level skills (tertiary). In 2006, the UK was ranked 17th of 30 OECD 
countries for low skills, 18th for intermediate skills and 12th for high skills (UKCES, 2009). 
In 2012, of 34 OECD countries, the UK was ranked 19th for low skills, 24th for 
intermediate skills, and 11th for high skills (UKCES, 2014). Some 26 per cent of 25-64 
year olds held low-level skills in 2012, whilst 37 per cent held intermediate-level skills and 
38 per cent held high-level skills.  
The UK thus performs relatively well in terms of high skills. Indeed, the sharp rise in the 
share of the UK population with graduate level qualifications since the early 1990s has 
been a notable feature of the UK economy in recent years. However, the OECD rankings 
show that the supply of high-level skills is rising just as fast in many comparator 
economies. Compared to other countries, the UK’s position on intermediate skills is of 
more concern, both because the share of workers with such qualifications is low by 
international standards, but also because the OECD rankings suggest that the UK has 
fallen further behind other countries on this measure in recent times.  
1.7.2. Internationally-standardised measures of cognitive skills 
Further indications of the UK’s position are provided by internationally-standardised 
measures of cognitive skills.  
In the 2012 PISA assessment of 15-year-olds, students in the United Kingdom scored only 
at the OECD average in mathematics and reading, and slightly above average in science 
(OECD, 2014). Mean performance on each of these three measures had not changed 
since 2006 and 2009. 
In the 2012 PIAAC survey of adult skills, however, numerical proficiency in England and 
Northern Ireland was significantly below the OECD average, while proficiency in literacy 
and in ICT-related problem-solving were both close to the average (OECD, 2013: Figure 
2.13). In all three areas, younger people in the UK (those aged 16-24) were found to be 
less proficient than older adults, such that levels of proficiency among younger people in 
the UK were among the lowest of all countries. When put together with the recent 
expansion of tertiary education, this suggests a clear polarisation in attainment among 
young people in the UK. 
1.7.3 Evidence on skill demand and skill utilisation 
Skill attainments are, of course, important in creating the potential for greater productivity 
within the economy, but in order for this potential to be fulfilled, the skills possessed by 
individual workers must also be efficiently utilised. Despite the expansion of tertiary 
education in the UK, evidence from PIAAC indicates a relatively low demand for 
educational qualifications by UK employers (OECD, 2013). Estimates from PIAAC indicate 
that only a third of jobs in England and Northern Ireland require tertiary qualifications, 
placing England and Northern Ireland 16th out of 22 OECD countries on this particular 
measure (ibid., p.168).  
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The same survey indicates that around 30 per cent of workers in England and Northern 
Ireland possess a qualification which exceeds the level required for someone to be 
recruited to their job, with this being the second highest figure out of 22 OCED countries, 
exceeded only by Japan (ibid., p.171). This comparative finding reflects the trend towards 
increasing over-qualification in Britain as a whole between 1986 and 2006, which was only 
reversed slightly between 2006 and 2012 (Felstead et al., 2013). 
As yet, there is not a clear understanding of the extent to which cross-country differences 
in skill utilisation can be explained by institutional features of the labour market. In her 
review of the evidence, Quintini (2011: 23-28) suggests that institutional factors - such as 
the amount spent on education and training, the strength of employment protection, the 
degree of co-ordination in wage bargaining, and the use of active labour market policies - 
can all affect the level of matching efficiency in the economy, but that broader factors 
affecting the supply of, and demand for, skills are the more important cause of high 
mismatch rates. This suggests that measures to increase employers’ demand for the 
increasing numbers of degree-qualified workers is a key priority for the UK going forward.  
1.7.4 Future trends in education levels 
Forecasts of future education levels in the UK and other OECD countries suggest mixed 
fortunes for the UK in the medium-term (Bosworth, 2014). The proportion of the population 
qualified at intermediate level (upper secondary) is projected to decline slightly (from 37 
per cent to 34 per cent) in the period to 2020 which, together with changes in other 
countries, is forecast to result in a decline in the UK’s ranking from 24th to 28th out of 33 
OECD nations. Conversely, the proportion of the UK’s adult population qualified at the 
higher (tertiary) level is projected to increase from 37 per cent to 48 per cent, improving 
the UK’s international ranking from 11th to 7th (overtaking Finland, Norway, the United 
States and Australia). These forecast trends suggest that some emphasis must be placed 
in the coming years on raising investments in intermediate skills. They also further 
emphasise the importance of raising employers’ demand for (and utilisation of) high level 
skills. 
1.7.5 Economy-wide measures of human capital 
The foregoing evidence suggests that the UK performs relatively well at some attainment 
levels, and less well at others, but gives no general overview of the quality of the labour 
force. Such a view is provided by those who have developed labour quality indices for the 
purposes of growth accounting or econometric analysis.  
Mason et al. (2014) present data for the UK and five other European countries showing the 
absolute levels and growth rates of a quality-adjusted skill index for the period 1980-2007 
(see Figure 5).13 Germany has the highest level of labour quality throughout this period. 
However, its lead narrowed greatly as a result of more rapid growth in certified 
qualifications in the other countries (especially in the UK) in this period. The UK performs 
13 The index is derived from the quantity of labour inputs at each of five qualification levels, weighted by a 
factor proportional to the average wage premium of workers with a given qualification level over workers with 
no qualifications. The baseline is a notional country in which all workers are in the lowest of the five 
qualification groups (giving an index value of 1.0).    
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particularly strongly in Mason et al.’s analysis, rising from the fifth-best performer in 1980 
to the second-best in 2007.  
Figure 1.5: Growth in labour-quality indices, 1980-2007 
 
Source: Mason et al. (2014: Figure 3).  
 
Kang et al. (2012) extend this approach through to 2009 and show that growth in labour 
quality in the UK exceeded that seen in Germany, France, Denmark and Sweden over the 
period 2002-2009, and matched that seen in the Netherlands over the same period. They 
also develop an expanded measure of human capital growth, which takes account of 
growth in training capital, and show that the UK posted higher growth on this measure than 
almost any other EU country over the period 2002-2007 (though again on a par with the 
Netherlands).  
Such approaches build on measures of qualifications attainments by also factoring in the 
relative productivity of employees in different qualification groups (as proxied by their 
wage). This arguably provides a more general picture of the human capital that resides 
among the workforce. Others have gone further, however, by considering the productive 
potential of everyone in the labour market. Fraumeni and Liu (2015) provide an overview 
of the methodology and some initial results. The method involves computing each person’s 
discounted lifetime income as a function of their age, likely educational attainment and 
likely earnings, and then computing the sum of the total potential future earnings of 
everyone in the labour market. The results place Britain second only to the US in the 18 
countries included in Fraumeni and Liu’s analysis, and above France, Denmark and the 
Netherlands (Sweden and Germany are not included). The results therefore indicate that 
the British workforce have significant potential for productive activity if they can be suitably 
employed. 
1.7.6 Summary 
To summarise, the overall picture suggests that other developed countries are 
outperforming the UK on a number of measures of skills, particularly at intermediate level. 
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However, growth in high-level skills has been strong, and monetised estimates of the total 
stock of human capital (e.g. Fraumeni and Liu (2015) put the UK in a relatively strong 
position with respect to its competitors). As regards the future, much would seem to 
depend on whether the UK can raise its investments in intermediate skills and, perhaps 
most importantly, whether it can address the relatively weak levels of demand among 
employers for its expanding stock of high-level skills.  
1.8. Next steps 
The foregoing review has shown that there is considerable evidence in support of the role 
of education and skills in raising productivity. A number of empirical studies have been 
cited which use growth accounting to show that up-skilling made a positive contribution to 
labour productivity growth in the UK in the years leading up to the crisis. Econometric 
studies, both for the UK and other countries, also give insights into the mechanisms by 
which education and skills can raise growth, either in the short or long term. In the next 
part of the study, we go on to expand the evidence in both of these respects. In the 
following sections we produce new descriptive analysis covering more recent 
developments, and new growth accounting estimates of the contribution of labour quality 
to productivity growth in the UK in the years since the crisis. This considers different sub-
periods to investigate whether the role of skills has changed as a consequence of the 
recession and we compare the experience of the UK with that of other major global 
economies. In later sections, we also conduct econometric analyses at industry-level to 
further examine the role of skills in raising productivity. A particular focus of our 
econometric analyses is the interactions between labour force skills and intangible assets: 
something which has been little explored in the literature to date.  
2. Descriptive Analysis 
2.1. Analysis of Trends  
The objective of this section is to provide an overview of aggregate productivity 
developments in the UK relative to countries covered in the analytical sections of this 
report, namely the United States, France, Germany, Netherlands, Finland and Sweden. 
We do so for different sub-periods ranging from 1995 to 2013. Wherever possible, the 
main results emerging from this part of the analysis will be related to existing evidence 
previously covered in section 1. The productivity analysis in this section draws mainly from 
the Conference Board Total Economy's Database, which contains recent productivity 
figures.  
We also provide evidence of recent changes in employment shares across different skill 
groups, using the most recent estimates from the UK Labour Force Survey,  the European 
Labour Force Survey14 (EU countries) and the Current Population Survey (for the US). In 
addition we provide an overview of how earnings have evolved.  All of the results 
14 We are grateful to Eurostat for granting us access to the micro-data files of  European Labour 
Force Survey and the Structure of Earnings Survey. All results and conclusions are the authors' and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of Eurostat.  
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presented in this section are based on the authors’ original calculations using available 
data sources.  
2.1.1 Recent aggregate productivity trends 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the trends in labour productivity when measured as GDP per hour 
worked (see Appendix figure A.2.1 and Table A.2.1 for comparable trends in terms of GDP 
per person employed). Our analysis focuses on GDP per hour worked as this measure is 
considered a more accurate indicator of productivity developments over the cycle. It 
accounts for actual hours worked, which can be more easily adjusted than the number of 
persons employed. Table 2.1 contains details of the underlying growth rates of the 
different sub-periods considered. During the period 1995 to 2007 labour productivity in the 
UK increased steadily, with annual growth rates of 2.5%.  
The period spanning from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s was characterised by a 
worldwide surge in adoption and diffusion of information and communication technologies 
(ICTs), and productivity grew in many countries. Compared to its competitors the UK 
achieved relatively high labour productivity growth during the period 1995-2002 (2.5% per 
annum in terms of GDP per hour worked); this was slightly higher than in the US (2.4%). 
During the period 2003-2007 labour productivity continued to experience similarly rapid 
growth (2.5%), outpacing that in the US (1.6%). Only Finland and Sweden grew at higher 
rates (2.6% and 2.8% respectively).   
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, labour productivity in the UK fell significantly, 
declining, on average, by -0.8% over the period 2008-2010. The majority of other EU 
countries also suffered a fall in labour productivity levels, but the decline in UK productivity 
was more marked. France and Germany experienced decreases in GDP per hour worked 
of -0.2% and -0.3%, respectively. In the Netherlands and Sweden, productivity growth 
rates were -0.1%. The idea that the existence of a 'productivity puzzle' is not a UK-specific 
phenomenon has been gaining support (Bank of England, 2014). The US performance is 
the most remarkable as  labour productivity growth continued to be strong (1.7% on 
average). This is consistent with the majority of existing evidence which highlights the 
strength of US recovery after the initial productivity slump (Foster et al., 2013). Despite the 
productivity slowdown being felt across the majority of the developed world, the UK seems 
to have fared worse than most EU countries in terms of productivity growth. Figure 
2.2 illustrates levels of labour productivity of EU countries relative to the US, highlighting 
the main convergence and divergence patterns15. It has been widely reported that the US 
productivity lead was amplified thanks to its greater ability to invest and reap the benefits 
of the new information technologies. While selected EU countries’ productivity showed 
signs of catching up to the US levels in the pre-crisis years, the position of EU countries 
has worsened since that time. However, the trends differ by country.  
Figure 2.2 illustrates labour productivity levels relative to the US. Of the EU countries 
considered here, the Netherlands has the highest level of labour productivity; in fact, at the 
beginning of the sample period, the level of labour productivity in the Netherlands was 
above that in the US. Of the remaining EU countries, France had the highest labour 
productivity level at the beginning of the period that we are analysing, followed by 
Germany, the UK and Sweden. UK productivity growth in the years leading up to the crisis 
15 The present analysis is based on The Conference Board Total Economy Database (TED), which 
includes very recent information on determinants of growth for a large number of economies.  
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was exceptional, and consequently the productivity gap relative to the United States, 
France, and Germany narrowed. Sweden and Finland also experienced strong growth 
during this period. At the onset of the financial and economic crisis the productivity gap 
between the UK and some major EU countries, in particular France and Germany, started 
to widen again.  
In common with the UK, labour productivity in Germany also remains below its level at the 
beginning of the crisis although it has started to catch up to its pre-crisis growth path. The 
weakness in German productivity can be accounted for by unusually strong employment 
performance. The United States and France are at or above their pre-crisis productivity 
levels.  
In this section we have described the main UK productivity trends for the UK relative to the 
other countries in our study. UK productivity performance was strong in the mid-1990s and 
early 2000s. The UK achieved higher growth rates than the rest of the countries analysed. 
This was attributed to the diffusion of ICTs and TFP gains outside the ICT production 
sector itself, mainly market service sectors. This exceptional productivity performance 
helped in narrowing the productivity gap relative to other leading economies. Since the 
start of the financial crisis, however, UK productivity fell significantly and has fared worse 
than many of these countries. As a consequence, the gap in terms of productivity levels 
with respect to countries such as United States, France and Germany is widening again. 
This is despite the fact that productivity growth in the European countries was also 
adversely affected by the economic downturn. 
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Figure 2.1 Labour productivity levels (GDP per hour), 1995-2013. 
 
Source:  The Conference Board Total Economy Database (Updated Jan 2014).  
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 Table 2.1 GDP per hour, Average growth rates by sub-period, 1995-2013.  
  1995-
2002 
2002-
2007 
2007-
2010 
2010-
2013 
United Kingdom 2.5% 2.5% -0.8% -0.2% 
France 2.0% 1.2% -0.2% 0.6% 
Germany 1.8% 1.6% -0.3% 0.9% 
Netherlands 1.4% 2.0% -0.1% -0.5% 
Sweden 2.5% 2.6% -0.1% 1.2% 
Finland 2.4% 2.8% -1.1% 0.6% 
United States 2.4% 1.6% 1.7% 0.8% 
Source:  The Conference Board Total Economy Database (Updated Jan 2014); own calculations.  
 
 Figure 2.2. GDP per hour worked relative to US, 1995-2013.  
 
Source:  The Conference Board Total Economy Database (Updated Jan 2014); own calculations.  
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 The weakness of UK labour productivity since the onset of the recession is closely linked 
to the strong performance of the labour market. In the aftermath of a recession, labour 
productivity usually declines, as the labour market does not adjust immediately after 
production is cut. During the 2008-2009 recession, however, UK firms cut employment 
even less than might have been expected, given the depth of the economic contraction 
and developments in other advanced countries (Hughes and Saleheen, 2012); moreover, 
firms began hiring again when the economy started to recover. Several years on, 
employment growth remains relatively strong and productivity persistently weak.  
Many explanations have been put forward to explain the most favourable outcomes 
observed in the UK’s labour market during the first stages of the downturn (Dolphin and 
Hatfield, 2015), amongst them the high costs of shedding and hiring labour faced by firms, 
and the retention of workers employed in alternative activities such as the creation of 
intangibles (Goodridge et al., 2014) 
Labour hoarding, along with the shift in the capital-labour ratio driven by a decline in real 
wages, is one of the main demand-side explanations for the fall in UK productivity during 
the recession. It has been argued that labour hoarding in the UK was also encouraged by 
several policy initiatives such as employment subsidies and the car scrappage scheme 
(Dolphin and Hatfield, 2015).  
The case of Germany is another example of a mild response of the labour market to the 
economic crisis. Germany experienced almost no increase in unemployment during the 
2008-2009 recession, and the labour market adjusted via reduction in working hours per 
employee and not via reduction in the number of employees. The large degree of internal 
flexibility, favoured for earlier structural reforms, undoubtedly played a significant role 
(Rinne and Zimmerman, 2011). One of the main instruments that allowed firms to retain 
their qualified workforce despite the severity of the recession was the introduction of 
government-subsidised short-time work contracts. 
2.1.2 Skill groups 
The four skill groups considered in the report are based on the 1997 International 
Standard Classification of Education (ISCED97) and are defined as follows:   
 
• Higher (bachelor degree and above: ISCED level 5A and 6). 
• Upper-intermediate (ISCED levels 4, 5B).  
• Lower-intermediate (both vocational and general: ISCED levels 3A and 3B). 
• Low-skilled (ISCED levels 3C, 2 or lower).  
 
See box below for details on the types of qualifications included in each of the groups. The 
division between the higher and upper-intermediate groups corresponds to the boundary 
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 between long-cycle (theory-based programmes with a minimum duration of three years 
(full-time)) and short-cycle higher education (programmes of typically shorter duration 
focused on practical, technical and occupational skills16); see Mason et al. ( 2014).  
 
Information to support this particular grouping of qualifications was derived from 
CEDEFOP Country Reports showing how qualifications in each of the seven countries are 
allocated to different levels on the ISCED scale17. We also drew on summary files 
prepared by UNESCO for additional information on programme orientation (i.e., whether 
they are general or vocational in nature)18.  
  
16 Tertiary-type A programmes (ISCED 5A) are largely theory-based and are designed to provide sufficient 
qualifications for entry to advanced research programmes and professions with high-skill requirements, such 
as medicine, dentistry or architecture. Tertiary-type A programmes have a minimum cumulative theoretical 
duration (at tertiary level) of three years’ full-time equivalent, although they typically last four or more years’ 
(OECD, 2002, p. 375).  
Tertiary-type B programmes (ISCED 5B) are typically shorter than those of tertiary-type A and focus on 
practical, technical or occupational skills for direct entry into the labour market, although some theoretical 
foundations may be covered in the respective programmes. They have a minimum duration of two years (full-
time equivalent), at the tertiary level’ (OECD, 2002, p. 376).  
 
17 CEDEFOP (2009): United Kingdom. VET in Europe – Country Report 2009, ReferNet United 
Kingdom; France. VET in Europe – Country Report 2009, ReferNet France; Germany. VET in Europe 
– Country Report 2009, ReferNet Germany; Spain. VET in Europe – Country Report 2009, ReferNet 
Spain; Netherlands. VET in Europe – Country Report 2009, Karel Visser (ECBO, Netherlands); 
Denmark. VET in Europe – Country Report 2009; ReferNet Denmark; Vocational education and 
training in Sweden: short description, Cedefop Panorama series 180. 
18 The weblinks for these UNESCO files are: 
http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/dsis/edtcs/library?l=/public/unesco_collection/programmes_isced97&vm=det
ailed&sb=Title; 
http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/dsis/edtcs/library?l=/public/unesco_collection/programmes_isced97/uoe2008
_iscmap_databasex/_EN_1.0_&a=d 
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 Notes on the 1997 ISCED classification19 of education: [Derived from OECD, 
Education at a Glance, 2002, Glossary] 
ISCED 6: ‘Advanced research programmes: Programmes that lead directly to the award of 
an advanced research qualification, e.g. Ph.D. The theoretical duration of these 
programmes is three years, full-time, in most countries (for a cumulative total of at least 
seven years full-time equivalent at the tertiary level), although the actual enrolment time is 
typically longer. Programmes are devoted to advanced study and original research’. 
ISCED 5A: ‘Tertiary-type A programmes [which] are largely theory-based and are 
designed to provide sufficient qualifications for entry to advanced research programmes 
and professions with high skill requirements, such as medicine, dentistry or 
architecture. They have a minimum cumulative theoretical duration (at tertiary level) of 
three years’ full-time equivalent, although they typically last four or more years’.  
ISCED 5B: ‘Tertiary-type B programmes [which] are typically shorter than those of tertiary-
type A and focus on practical, technical or occupational skills for direct entry into the 
labour market, although some theoretical foundations may be covered in the respective 
programmes. They have a minimum duration of two years full-time equivalent at the 
tertiary level’. 
ISCED 4: ‘Post-secondary non-tertiary education straddles the boundary between upper 
secondary and post-secondary education from an international point of view, even though 
it might clearly be considered upper secondary or post-secondary programmes in a 
national context. Although their content may not be significantly more advanced than 
upper secondary programmes, they serve to broaden the knowledge of participants who 
have already gained an upper secondary qualification. The students tend to be older than 
those enrolled at the upper secondary level’. 
ISCED 3: ‘Upper secondary education corresponds to the final stage of secondary 
education in most OECD countries. The entrance age to this level is typically 15 or 16 
years. The typical duration of ISCED 3 programmes …. typically [ranges] from two to five 
years of schooling. ISCED 3 may either be “terminal” (i.e., preparing the students for entry 
directly into working life) and/or “preparatory” (i.e., preparing students for tertiary 
education)’. ISCED 3A and 3B programmes can enable direct access to tertiary education 
courses (ISCED 5) if students do not enter the labour market and typically signify a higher 
level of attainment than ISCED 3C programmes which do not enable access to tertiary 
education.    
ISCED 2: ‘Lower secondary education Completes provision of basic education, usually in 
a more subject-oriented way with more specialist teachers. Entry follows six years of 
primary education; duration is three years. In some countries, the end of this level marks 
the end of compulsory education’. 
ISCED 1: ‘Designed to provide a sound basic education in reading, writing and 
mathematics and a basic understanding of some other subjects’. 
19 The ISCED 2011 classification is only available from 2014 onwards in the EU LFS. It is based on 
the following categories: 0 Early childhood, 1 Primary education 2 Lower secondary education 3 
Upper secondary education 4 Post-secondary non-tertiary education 5 Short-cycle tertiary education 
6 Bachelor or equivalent 7 Master or equivalent 8 Doctoral or equivalent.  
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 ISCED 0: ‘The first stage of organised instruction designed to introduce very young 
children to the school atmosphere’. 
 
UNESCO summary files for the US show a less detailed allocation to ISCED levels20 than 
we have had available for European countries. Thus, whilst it is possible to differentiate 
between lower intermediate general education and lower intermediate vocational 
education with EU data, this is no longer practical once the US is included; therefore the 
two lower intermediate groups are collapsed together into one 'Lower intermediate' group.  
For the UK only, we are able to present growth accounting estimates for both lower-
intermediate general and lower-intermediate vocational groups.  
Making use of US Census Bureau estimates of enrolments at different levels in 2009 21 
and estimates derived from the US Current Population Survey, we have allocated US 
qualifications in the manner shown in Table 2.2 below.  
  
20 http://www.uis.unesco.org/Education/ISCEDMappings/Pages/default.aspx 
21 Ryan S. and Siebens, J. (2012), Educational attainments in the United States: 2009, Current 
Population Reports, Washington, DC: US Census Bureau. Available at: 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/p20-566.pdf 
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 Table 2.2: Allocation of US qualifications to four qualification groups. 
Education attainment UNESCO 
allocation 
to ISCED 
level 
NIESR 
allocation to 
qualification 
group 
Comments 
Did not graduate from High 
School 
2 Low-skilled  
High School graduate 3 Lower 
intermediate 
 
‘Some college, no degree’  
 
[includes those shown by the 
US Census Bureau as holding 
vocational certificates below 
Associates degree level from 
college attendance after 
graduating from High School]  
4 50% lower 
intermediate; 
50% upper 
intermediate 
US Census Bureau estimates for 2009 
show approximately 70% of individuals 
aged over 25 in this category holding 
vocational certificates (below Associates 
degree level) from 1-2 years attendance at 
college. The remaining 30% are shown as 
holding vocational certificates from 12 
months or less attendance at college. 
An unknown proportion of individuals in the 
‘Some college, no degree category’ may 
not have acquired formal qualifications of 
any kind.  
Earnings estimates derived from the US 
Current Population Survey suggest that, on 
average, gross hourly earnings for 
individuals in the ‘Some college, no degree 
category’ are closer to those of High 
School graduates than the earnings of 
Associates degree holders.  
Taking all this information into account, we 
choose as a rough approximation to 
allocate half of persons in the ‘Some 
college, no degree category’ to the lower 
intermediate group and half to the lower 
intermediate group. 
Associate's Degrees 5 Upper 
intermediate 
Associate degrees are clearly more 
comparable to short-cycle higher education 
qualifications in European higher education 
systems than they are to Bachelor degrees 
Bachelor's Degrees and 
Higher Degrees 
5 & 6 Higher Bachelor degrees clearly equate to ISCED 
5A 
Own elaboration based on Mason et al. (2014) 
In European countries, the bulk of upper intermediate education is vocational or 
occupation-specific in nature. The same is not true at lower intermediate level, where there 
is a clear split between general and vocational education. Mason et al. (2014) then 
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 distinguish between lower-intermediate vocational and lower intermediate-general 
qualifications but, as noted above, we aggregate these two qualifications into one group - 
"lower intermediate" - in order to ensure consistency when comparing with the US 
education levels. 
 
Table 2.3 (adapted from Mason et al. 2014) shows the different UK qualifications included 
in the four skill groups considered in the report. 
 
Table 2.3. Classification of qualifications as listed in labour force surveys (based on 
ISCED 97), United Kingdom. 
 
Qualification group  ISCED97 level  UK qualifications  
Higher  5A,6  e.g. Bachelor degree, PhD, NVQ5  
Upper intermediate  4,5B  
e.g. NVQ4, diploma in higher 
education, other teaching 
qualifications below degree level.  
Lower intermediate  3A,3B  
General (3A): e.g. A-level or 
equivalent, AS level or equivalent, 
international baccalaureate, Welsh 
baccalaureate, access qualifications. 
Vocational (3B): e.g. NQV3, trade 
apprenticeships, City & guilds  
advanced craft level 3 Diploma, Level 
3 Certificate. 
Low-skilled  3C, 2 or lower  
e.g. NVQ1, NVQ2, City & guilds part 
1 and 2,GCSE below C. 
O-level, GCSE grade A*-C, or 
equivalent. 
No qualifications.  
Adapted from Mason et al. (2014)
39 
 2.1.3 Trends in aggregate employment by skill group 
In this section we describe changes in employment shares by skill group for the overall UK 
economy, compared to the other benchmark countries. We also compare these trends with 
those observed in the US. 
The UK employment shares are constructed using the information contained in the micro-
files of the UK Labour Force Survey. The EU countries employment shares are based on 
the European Labour Force Survey micro-files, and the US employment shares are 
derived using information from the Current Population Survey. We divide the total 
workforce into four groups22, and calculate the shares accrued by each of the groups, 
separately by country and time period.  
Figures 2.3-2.8 illustrate the employment shares of the different skill groups in three 
different sub-periods for the UK and EU countries. For the UK we report annual 
employment shares, whilst for the remaining of countries we report estimates for three 
sub-periods: 2001-2007, 2008-2010, and 2011-2013 (the sub-periods are slightly different 
in the case of Finland, Sweden and Germany for which data availability is more limited). 
Appendix tables A.2.2 and A.2.3 show the shares for each year from 2002 to 2013. The 
analysis focuses on the period from 2001 onwards, as the detailed skill classification was 
not always available prior to 2001.  
During the early 2000s, using population-weighted figures, the share of employment with 
at least a bachelor degree was just above 20% in the UK (see Figure 2.3). This 
percentage was higher than that in France and Germany (both around 16%), and Finland 
(around 19%) and similar to that in Sweden; this percentage was however smaller than in 
the Netherlands (26%).   
In the UK the proportion of highly-skilled workers continued to rise throughout the period 
analysed, and in 2013 stood at just below 35%. The high-skilled share of employment also 
rose in each of the other countries under consideration, but less rapidly than in the UK. 
During 2011 and 2013, the share of workers with a high-level academic qualification in 
France and Germany rose to 18% and 21% respectively. In Finland the proportion 
increased from 19% to 27% and in the Netherlands it rose from 26 to 31%.  
The percentage of employment in the UK with an upper-intermediate vocational 
qualification (ISCED 4 or 5B) did not change dramatically during the period 
analysed, fluctuating just above 10% of the total workforce. In France the percentage 
was higher at 12% during the period 2001-2007 and has increased to 14% since 2007. In 
Germany this share was higher than that in the UK at 17% and increased to 20% during 
2011-2013. The share for this group is smaller in the Netherlands, however, standing at 
6% in 2001-2007 and decreasing thereafter to only 4% in the period 2011-13.  
The proportion of the UK's workforce with a lower-intermediate qualification (ISCED 
3A, 3B) is around 25% and this has not changed greatly over time. The share is 
considerably higher in Germany, where more than half of workers held this type of 
qualifications in the earlier period - although it has since fallen slightly to just below 50%. 
22 We had to exclude from the survey those individuals that reported qualifications in the ISCED levels 
5 (without distinction of a, b, or c) and aggregate skill level 4-5 together. The number of observations 
excluded was below 5% of total observations, in all countries.  
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 The group is smaller in France than both in the UK and Germany, although it has slightly 
increased its size - from 15% to 17%.  Finland is the country where the share of this group 
in the total workforce is most similar to that in Germany: the proportion of workers with 
lower-intermediate qualification is just below 50%.  
The proportion of the UK's workforce that have low or no qualifications (ISCED 3C, 2 or 
lower) was around 43% during the early 2000s. The low-skilled labour share has 
decreased significantly (by over 10 percentage points) and in 2013 stood at around 
30%. The proportion of France's workforce with no qualifications is higher than in the UK, 
but has also reduced over time. In Germany the employment share of persons with low or 
no qualifications is considerably lower, and has declined since the crisis, from 16% in 
2001-2007 to 14% in 2011-2013. Sweden and the Netherlands have relatively high shares 
in this group but both show declining trends in low-skilled employment similar to other 
countries. 
Figure 2.3. Employment shares by skill group, 2001-2013, UK Labour Force Survey 
Quarterly files (October to December quarter).  
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
%
High Upper-intermediate Lower-intermediate Low
Source: UK LFS 
 
 
 
 
 
41 
 Figure 2.4. Employment shares by skill group, France, 2001-2013. 
 
Source: EU LFS 
Figure 2.5. Employment shares by skill group, Germany, 2001-2013.
Source: EU LFS 
42 
 Figure 2.6. Employment shares by skill group, Finland, 2001-2013. 
 
Source: EU LFS 
Figure 2.7. Employment shares by skill group, Netherlands, 2001-2013. 
Source: EU LFS 
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 Figure 2.8. Employment shares by skill group, Sweden, 2006-2013. 
 
Source: EU LFS 
 
Table 2.4 below shows the percentage of the US workforce in different qualification 
groups23. The percentage of workers with a bachelor degree (or higher) in the US has 
increased since the mid 1990s. The proportion of the workforce with a “bachelor degree” 
went up from 18% in 1995-2002 to 22% in 2011-2014. Combined with those with “higher 
degrees”, the high-skilled share of the workforce is similar to that in the UK by the end of 
the period. Thus the UK appears to have caught up with the US in qualifications at level 5A 
and 6.  The incidence of “associate degrees” has risen over time, although the incidence of 
those with “some college” studies (but without a degree) has fallen. The percentage of 
those with lower-level qualifications such as "high school graduate" or those that “did not 
graduate from high school” also decreased, consistent with the trends observed in Europe.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 These groups have been collapsed into four for the growth accounting analysis, to ensure 
comparability with the European countries. 
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Table  2.4  Employment shares by qualification group  in the US- Percentages (%), 
1995-2014. 
 
 Qualification Skill group 1995-
2002 
2003-
2007 
2008-
2010 
2011-
2014 
Higher degrees Higher 8.9 10.1 11.2 12.1 
Bachelor degrees Higher 18.2 19.9 21.4 22.3 
Associate degrees Upper int. 8.4 9.3 9.9 10.5 
Some college but no degree 
Upper/Low
er Int. 
20.3 19.5 19.3 19.0 
High school graduate Lower int. 31.5 29.7 28.4 27.2 
Did not graduate from high 
school 
Low skilled 12.7 11.6 9.9 8.9 
       
TOTAL  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Source:  US Current Population Survey, own calculations. 
 
2.1.4 Wages 
The skill groups identified above also vary in terms of the wages they are paid. This is an 
important element to consider when computing changes in labour composition as 
discussed below. Figure 2.9 illustrates the differences in average earnings between the 
different skill groups in the UK for the period 2001-2013, not controlling for other factors. 
Equivalent information for the Continental European countries between 2002-1024 and the 
US between 2002-13 is shown in Appendix figures A.2.2-A.2.7.  
The source of information on wages for the UK is the Quarterly Labour Force Survey, for 
the US it is the Current Population Survey, and for the Continental European countries, it 
is the Structure of Earnings Survey. For Germany, we also use information from the 
German Socio-Economic Panel, in combination with the Structure of Earnings Survey.  
Unsurprisingly, average earnings increase with the level of academic attainment in all the 
countries considered. For the UK, figure 2.9 reveals that average gross hourly earnings for 
high-skilled employment experienced positive growth up to 2009 in the UK. Since then 
wages have remained largely stagnant. A similar pattern is also observed across 
qualification groups.  
We look now at the differences in earnings amongst the different skill groups, which is 
relevant for the calculation of labour composition. At the beginning of the period 
considered, say in 2002, the graduate premium (high skill to low skill wage ratio) was just 
over 2 in the UK. This ratio was higher than in Finland, Netherlands and Sweden, although 
lower than in France (2.4), Germany (2.5), and the US (2.7).  
Over time, the ratio between the wages of the high-skilled and the wages of the low-skilled 
has decreased gradually in the UK. Based on detailed figures for annual average gross 
hourly earnings (presented in Appendix tables A.2.4 and A.2.5), the ratio was 2.09 in 2002 
24 2002 is the first year for which we have available data for Continental European countries. 
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 (£15.12/£7.24), 1.97 in 2009 (£17.96/£9.12) and 1.90 in 2013 (£18.06/£9.51). See Table 
2.5.  
For the latter part of this period, these estimates are consistent with evidence from 
Blundell et al. (2014) that between 2009 and 2012 average real hourly wages fell more 
among individuals at the top of the income distribution than among individuals in the 
middle and at the bottom of the distribution, while in previous recessions wages continued 
to grow faster for individuals at the top of the distribution.  Blundell et al. argue that one 
possible explanation may be the falling employment share of the financial industry and the 
general slowdown of wage growth in this sector. The fact that wages at the bottom of the 
distribution decreased less can also be linked to the introduction of the minimum wage in 
1999. Their analysis is based on a range of individual-level data sources, such as the 
Labour Force Survey, the New Earnings Survey Panel Dataset, the English Longitudinal 
Survey of Aging, and the Family Expenditure Survey. Blundell et al. overall do not find 
strong evidence that the decline in productivity and real wages has been driven by labour 
composition effects, but rather by declines in wages of existing workers. These are now 
more willing to work at any given wage given the increased labour supply and greater 
competition for jobs, compared to past recessions. 
Table 2.5 shows the evolution of the high-skilled to low-skilled wage ratios in all seven 
countries under consideration (underlying data are available in Appendix table A.2.5). The 
pay premium to the highest skilled in the US is around 2.7 and has not varied greatly over 
time; this is higher than in the majority of European countries, which is affected by the fact 
that some workers classified as low intermediate in the US might be regarded as low 
skilled in European countries. The exception is Germany, where the wage premium to the 
high skilled has increased over time, from 2.5 in 2002 to 2.75 in 2009. In the US, wages 
have remained fairly static for both the high and low groups while declining for the 
intermediate groups.  
Between 2002 and 2010 the high-skilled to low-skilled wage ratio remained relatively 
stable in the Netherlands, as in the US. By contrast this ratio declined gradually over this 
period by an estimated 7% in the UK and 11% in Finland and more steeply by 23% in 
France and 27% in Sweden. For the UK and US we have wage data up till 2013 which 
show that the high-skilled to low-skilled wage ratio in the UK continued to decline slightly 
relative to the equivalent US ratio between 2010 and 2013 (Table 2.5). 
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Figure 2.9. Average hourly earnings in the UK, by skill group, UK Labour Force 
Survey Quarterly files (October to December quarter).  
 
Source: UK LFS 
Table 2.5. Ratios of high-skilled to low-skilled average gross hourly earnings, 2002-
10 (Continental European countries), 2002-2009 (Germany), 2002-13 (UK and US). 
 Finland France Germany Netherlands Sweden UK United 
States 
2002 1.62 2.37 2.49 1.94 1.77 2.09 2.70 
2003 1.61 2.21 2.49 1.94 1.66 2.12 2.66 
2004 1.59 2.07 2.67 1.94 1.55 2.03 2.70 
2005 1.58 1.94 2.55 1.94 1.44 1.96 2.72 
2006 1.56 1.81 2.67 1.93 1.34 1.99 2.69 
2007 1.53 1.81 2.63 1.95 1.34 1.94 2.68 
2008 1.50 1.81 2.67 1.96 1.33 1.90 2.66 
2009 1.48 1.81 2.75 1.98 1.33 1.97 2.62 
2010 1.45 1.82 - 1.99 1.32 1.94 2.70 
2011 - - - - - 1.91 2.64 
2012 - - - - - 1.91 2.67 
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 2013 - - - - - 1.90 2.68 
% change 
2002-1025 
-11 -23 10 2 -25 -7 0 
% change 
2002-13 
     -9 -1 
Sources: UK: Quarterly Labour Force Survey; US: Current Population Survey;  Continental European 
countries: Structure of Earnings Survey (plus German Socio-Economic Panel); German data only available 
up to 2009. 
 
2.2. Overview of Data Sources 
Data sources for whole-economy analysis 
The economy-level productivity analysis is based on four main data sources. The principal 
source is the Conference Board Total Economy Database (TED). In addition to providing 
us with information on recent productivity trends (e.g. GDP per hour, GDP per person), this 
database contains a detailed breakdown of the determinants of output growth. The TED 
database has been used to compile information on total GDP growth and a number of 
other growth accounting variables. It has the advantage of providing data for a large 
number of countries and for a large number of years up to 201326. To implement the 
growth accounting exercise (discussed in more detail in Section 3) we extracted 
information on variables such as growth in output, growth in employment, growth in hours, 
growth in ICT capital, and non-ICT capital, nominal output and labour's share in value-
added.  
The second data main source we use for the growth accounting analysis is the European 
Labour Force Survey (EU LFS)27. The European Labour Force Survey provides 
harmonised information on labour market developments in European countries since the 
mid 1980s. We use EU LFS data on employment by skill category in order to compute our 
own labour composition term28. The skill categories are compiled using annual data from 
the EU LFS variable HATLEVEL ("highest level of qualification attained"). We also use the 
EU LFS to obtain information on training received by employees. 
The third data source is the Structure of Earnings Survey, also compiled by Eurostat29. 
The objective of the Structure of Earnings Survey is to provide accurate and harmonised 
data on earnings in EU Member States. The SES is a large, enterprise-level sample 
survey providing detailed and comparable information on the relationships between the 
level of remuneration and individual characteristics of employees (sex, age, occupation, 
length of service, highest educational level attained etc.) and the characteristics of their 
employer (economic activity, size and location of the enterprise). More information is 
available in the documentation provided by Eurostat30. One drawback of the SES data is 
that it does not cover small firms with fewer than 10 employees; it also excludes public 
administration (as defined by the NACE classification of economic activities). 
25 Change 2002-2009 in the case of Germany. 
26 Data for TED 2014 is publicly available since April 2015. 
27 The EULFS anonymised microdata (scientific-use files) were sent to us via CD-ROM. 
28  The EULFS is a richer database than currently used by the Conference Board. 
29 The SES anonymised microdata (scientific-use files) were sent to us via CD-ROM. 
30 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/structure_of_earnings_survey 
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 The four-yearly SES micro-data sets are available for the reference years 2002, 2006 and 
201031. Earnings is measured as the mean "gross hourly wage"32.  The main drawback of 
using the SES for the purpose of this research is the lack of time series variation. In order 
to overcome this problem we interpolated and extrapolated the series to derive information 
that would cover the whole period 2002-2013. For those years in between 2002 and 2006, 
and 2006 and 2010, we applied a linear interpolation calculation.  
Finally, for the US, we compile estimates of hours worked by skill group from the Current 
Population Survey (CPS), made available by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The CPS is 
also used to derive earnings by skill group for the US.  
Data issues 
One further limitation of the SES is that it provides limited information on earnings for 
Germany. DESTATIS (Germany) only gave their acceptance to include their SES data in 
the CD-ROM from reference year 2006 onwards and, even then, no information is 
available for some key qualification groups in 2006 and 2010. Accordingly, we compile 
information on wages for Germany from a different data source: the German Socio-
Economic Panel (GSOEP)33.   
In respect of skill groups, there were specific difficulties for Sweden and Finland. For 
Sweden, the EU LFS did not provide any information on "highest level of qualification 
attained" before 2006. For Finland it only provided information from 2002 onwards. For 
these two countries, we therefore have a more limited time period. 
Data sources for the industry-level analysis 
The industry-level econometric analysis draws mainly from the EUKLEMS database34, 
which provides industry-level data on value-added, and the use of different inputs,  
including capital investments and labour input. Section 4 provides further details on the 
construction of the variables.  
The EU LFS and SES were also used to obtain employment and wage estimates for each 
skill group at industry level. We use information on industry sector at NACE 1-digit level. 
Up to 2008 the surveys followed the NACE Rev.1 classification, and after 2008 the NACE 
Rev.2. We follow Eurostat guidelines in establishing an accurate correspondence between 
the two classifications, so as to ensure consistency in the definition of industries over time. 
In addition, our industry-level econometric analysis uses information from the INTAN-
INVEST platform35, which provides information on investment in different types of 
intangible investment at broad industry level up to 2010. This database covers assets 
related to  economic competencies, computerised information and innovative property 
(Corrado et al., 2012). 
31 The 2014 SES will not be released within the timeframe of the project. SES2014 is the next vintage 
of the earnings survey. The CD-ROM will only be available in spring of 2017.  
32 Mean hourly gross earnings are defined as gross earnings in the reference month divided by the 
number of hours paid during the same period. 
33 We use information from the German Socio Economic Panel for 2002, 2006, and 2009 for three 
skill groups (high, intermediate, and low-skilled) along with information from Structure of Earnings 
Survey for 2006, for four skill groups (high, upper-intermediate, lower-intermediate, low).  
34 www.euklems.net 
35 http://www.intan-invest.net 
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 3. Growth Accounting Analysis 
3.1. Methodology 
The Growth Accounting (GA) technique allows us to decompose the growth rate of an 
economy's total output into changes in the amount of factors used (capital and labour), 
and a part that cannot be accounted for by observable changes in factor utilisation. The 
unexplained part of growth in GDP, known as total factor productivity,  represents 
increases in output with the same amounts of inputs or the same output with less inputs. 
While often interpreted as a measure of broadly defined technological progress, the TFP 
component typically also captures the influence of other unmeasured influences on labour 
productivity, such as adjustment costs, scale and cyclical effects, omitted inputs, 
production inefficiencies, spillovers, and measurement error. 
More formally, the growth in output can be expressed as the cost-share weighted growth 
of inputs plus TFP (note that all variables are expressed in log terms).  
 
∆𝑦𝑦𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 =  𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙,𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐∆𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 +  𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐,𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐∆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐,𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐∆𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐,𝑐𝑐 +  ∆𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐,𝑐𝑐    
         (3.1) 
 
           
where ∆𝑦𝑦𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 is the growth rate of GDP in country c between year t and year t-1,   ∆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
denotes growth in ICT capital input over two consecutive periods t and t-1, ∆𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 denotes 
growth in non-ICT capital inputs, and ∆𝑙𝑙 denotes growth in labour input. Subscript c 
denotes country and subscript t denotes time36.  
Turning to the betas,  𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  denotes the share of labour compensation in total value 
added; 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 represents the share of ICT capital compensation in total value added; 𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 
represents the share of non-ICT capital compensation in total value added. 
The method relies on standard assumptions such as competitive output and factor markets 
which allow the calculation of shares in value added as this equals total cost. Typically 
constant returns to scale are also assumed, implying that the sum of the factor shares 
equals one; this has the advantage that capital’s share can be calculated as one minus 
labour’s share37.   
The labour input term from expression (3.1) can then be decomposed into two additional 
terms: total hours worked and changes in labour composition (also known as labour 
quality), as in: 
∆𝑙𝑙 = ∆ℎ + ∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 
36 When implementing the growth accounting at industry level a subscript j can be added to this 
expression. 
37 A standard neoclassical framework does not explicitly account for adjustment costs, variable factor 
utilisation, deviations from perfect competition and non-constant returns to scale. 
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 The following section (Section 3.1.1) provides a more detailed description of the labour 
input term. 
Equation (3.1) can also be expressed in terms of labour productivity. The total GDP growth 
in a country can be decomposed into the growth in hours and growth of labour productivity 
(measured as output per hour worked)38. Using this framework we are able to quantify the 
impact of: 
 
• Capital deepening; that is the amount of capital services available per unit of 
labour employed. Importantly, we allow a distinction between ICT capital assets 
(∆ictk), which comprises computers, software and communication equipment; and 
non-ICT capital assets (∆nictk), which comprises assets such as machinery, 
transport equipment, residential buildings and infrastructure.  
• changes in labour composition (∆LC); it captures the effect of changes in skill 
levels of workers (but more generally could be extended also to include changes in 
the age and  gender structure of the workforce).    
• total factor productivity growth; which is the part of labour productivity growth 
that is not attributable to measured input accumulation. 
It is the second element (labour composition) which we are most interested in within the 
scope of this project. 
 
3.1.1. Calculating the contribution of skills to growth 
The approach we follow to analyse the impact of human capital on productivity is to 
estimate flows of labour services from workers with different skill levels. The idea of 
adjusting for changes in the composition of the workforce is based on the notion that the 
hours worked by different groups of workers are likely to have different degrees of 
effectiveness. In this research the focus is on education level of workers as the key 
productivity-enhancing characteristic39.  
38 Equation (3.1)* is derived by subtracting Δh from both sides of (3.1). Omitting the subscripts c,t for 
convenience, this gives: 
TFPknictkictLChhhy nictictlablab ∆+∆+∆+∆+∆+∆−=∆−∆ bbbb   
This can be rewritten as : 
 
TFPhhknicthhkictLChhhy nictnictictictlablab ∆+∆+∆−∆+∆+∆−∆+∆+∆+∆−=∆−∆ bbbbbb )()(  
TFPhknicthkictLChh nictictlabnictictlab ∆+∆−∆+∆−∆+∆+∆+++∆−= )()()( bbbbbb  
Using the condition that: 1=++ nictictlab bbb  leads to the cancellation of the Δh terms and so yields: 
ct
ct
ctnict
ct
ctictctctlab
ct
TFP
h
knict
h
kictLC
h
y
∆+




∆+




∆+∆=





∆ ,,, bbb  
  
39 Other research focuses on other productivity-relevant characteristics such as age, gender or 
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 We propose a methodology where the contribution of labour input is split into hours 
worked and changes in composition of hours worked. This methodology is considered 
theoretically superior to the use of crude measures of labour, such as the total number of 
hours worked or number of employees, which assume homogeneous contributions to 
economic growth of different types of workers. This method was applied to the US by 
Jorgenson et al. (1987) and to EU countries within the EUKLEMS project (O’Mahony and 
Timmer, 2009). 
We thus construct a skill-adjusted labour input measure that distinguishes the 
contribution of four (five for the UK) different skill groups, defined by the levels of 
educational attainment (see definition in Section 2.1.2). Building on Kang et al. (2012) we 
investigate the extent of cross-country variations in the up-skilling of the labour force in the 
years after the financial crisis, and compare it with pre-recession developments.  
More formally, our measure of labour input, with both the hours and the labour composition 
components, can be derived using a Törnqvist quantity index of a number (𝑆𝑆) of individual 
labour types40: 
 
∆𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠,𝑐𝑐 = ∑ 𝑤𝑤�𝑠𝑠,𝑐𝑐∆𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠,𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠  = ∑ 𝑤𝑤�𝑠𝑠,𝑐𝑐∆𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛 𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆,𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠���������
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
+ ∑ ∆𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆,𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆            
         (3.2) 
       
where ∆𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠,𝑐𝑐 denotes the growth in hours worked by each skill group 𝑆𝑆 over two 
consecutive time periods t and t-1; 𝑤𝑤�𝑠𝑠,𝑐𝑐 represents the weights, given by the two- period 
average shares of each type of labour in total compensation; 𝑖𝑖 represents the time period 
considered. We consider different sub-periods in order to examine the impact of the 
recession (e.g. 2002-2007 vs. 2008-2013). 
In order to compute the contribution of labour to overall growth we multiply the labour input 
indices (both hours and labour composition indices) by the corresponding labour share 
(𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙,𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 as in expression (3.1)*). 
Equation 3.2 clearly shows that labour input can increase either because a) the number of 
hours worked increases, or b) the services per hour of labour increase; i.e. the labour force 
becomes more skilled and more productive. This distinction is particularly important if there 
are significant changes over time in the labour input.  
From the labour composition term in equation 3.2 it can clearly be seen that if the 
proportions of each labour type in the workforce change, this will have an impact on the 
growth of inputs, beyond any change in the number of hours worked. A shift of hours 
worked by less qualified workers to more qualified workers will be reflected in a positive 
contribution of labour services to growth. Changes in the hours worked by various types of 
workers are weighted by their compensation rates, and as we assume that workers are 
experience.  
40 For simplicity we omit here the country subscript. 
52 
                                                                                                                                                 
 paid their marginal productivities, skills with a higher remuneration will have a larger 
influence on the labour index41. 
The intuition behind equation 3.2 is that if the total number of hours worked stayed the 
same, but they were increasingly worked by more intelligent and able workers, which are 
presumed more efficient, this  would result in increased output.  
3.1.2. Calculating the contribution of on-the-job training to growth 
The basic growth accounting framework set out in Section 3.1 is now modified to account 
for the influence of a particular type of intangible investment: on-the-job training. We thus 
broaden the scope of the growth accounting framework to get a more thorough picture of 
productivity developments (see Oliner et al. (2008) for the US). A traditional growth 
accounting approach excludes intangible capital, but this type of capital has received much 
attention recently as a source of productivity gains.  
We now augment expression (3.1) to assess the influence of training, as follows42:  
∆𝑦𝑦 =  𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎∆ℎ +  𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿+𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎∆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎∆𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 ∆𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐾𝐾 + ∆𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹              
           (3.3) 
where the meaning of the input variables follow the definitions outlined in respect of 
expression (3.1). Now the 𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 indicates the share of training investment over total output.  
TRAINK represents the stock of training capital. Our approach to the construction of this 
indicator is based on the calculations in O'Mahony  (2012a, 2012b), which has also been 
applied recently by Mason et al. (2014) within a framework to investigate the impact of 
vocational and educational training on productivity growth.  
In this revised GA framework the labour and capital shares are adjusted to account for the 
investment in training. In a standard GA setting, the labour share represents the share of 
labour compensation in nominal output. As we now incorporate a new type of investment, 
not included in national accounting as it was mostly included in intermediate expenditures, 
the aggregate output needs to be modified to allow for the new type of investment. We first 
adjust the total output figure  to include the amount invested in training, and then we obtain 
the new labour share by dividing the total labour compensation by the adjusted output 
figure.        𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿/𝑌𝑌𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 
Finally, the assumption of constant returns to scale allows us to derive the new capital 
shares, given the new labour share and share of training investment:  
41 This is often considered a limitation, as the assumption that workers are paid their marginal productivities 
is valid mainly under competitive labour markets, which can be considered unrealistic in many instances.   
42 For simplicity we omit here the country and time subscripts.  
53 
                                            
  𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 +  𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 1 
 
The growth of TFP is then derived residually43. 
 
In order to compute training stocks we first estimated the value of investments in 
continuing training made by employers, which required a monetary valuation of the 
number of hours of training received by workers. Accordingly, we first estimated the 
amount of hours that workers spend on training activities. This information has been drawn 
from the EU labour force survey (using the variable COURATT44: "Attendance of courses, 
seminars, conferences, private lessons or instructions outside the regular education 
system within the last 4 weeks"). 
 
Training is treated here as an activity largely undertaken by firms who pay the direct costs 
of training programmes and who also incur indirect costs in terms of production output 
foregone (Corrado et al., 2009). Investments in continuous training in industry j, country c 
and time period t are calculated as follows:  
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐,𝑐𝑐 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐,𝑐𝑐 
where TI refers to nominal expenditures on investments in training, HTR to total hours 
spent training per worker and C is the cost of an hour’s training. Since average training 
durations are reported for the previous four weeks, this is converted to an annual figure, 
allowing for time lost due to holidays and other forms of absence. Hourly costs C have two 
elements: the direct costs of training (costs of running courses) and the opportunity costs 
of production or leisure time foregone due to time spent on training activities. Following 
Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1992), time away from production and leisure is valued at the 
market wage. 
To estimate the impact of these training investments on productivity, it is necessary to 
convert investment values to volumes and construct measures of intangible training capital 
stocks. As the indirect components of the hourly costs vary with wages through time, we 
used an earnings index to deflate nominal investments to a constant price series. 
The perpetual inventory method that cumulates investments and subtracts depreciation is 
then employed to convert real investments to capital stocks. The most common 
assumption employed on the form of the depreciation function is the rate of  geometric 
depreciation. If we let RTI denote investment in constant terms, K denote capital and 
𝛿𝛿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 the depreciation rate, this allows the stock of training capital at any point in time t to 
be estimated as follows:  
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐾𝐾𝑐𝑐,𝑐𝑐 = 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐾𝐾𝑐𝑐,𝑐𝑐−1(1 − 𝛿𝛿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) + 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 
43 We do not use the Conference Board estimates for total factor productivity as we now account for 
training.  
44Training is measured by the participation.  
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 Applying a geometric depreciation rate implies that proportionally more of an asset is 
depreciated early in the life of the asset. It is common in the intangibles literature to 
employ relatively high depreciation rates to take account of the idea that many of these 
investments are associated with new technologies that change relatively rapidly. We 
employ  here a 25% depreciation rate per year. For a discussion of the sensitivity of the 
intangible training capital stock estimates to the underlying assumptions, see O’Mahony 
(2012a, 2012b).  
Finally, we estimate measures of intangible investments in training by skill type for all 
European countries covered in the report. For all countries studied we distinguish between 
workers with higher qualifications (ISCED 5A-6), upper-intermediate-level qualifications 
(ISCED 5B-4), lower intermediate qualifications (3A, 3B), and low-level qualifications 
(ISCED 1-2). For the UK we consider five skill groups, as we are able to break down the 
lower intermediate group (3) into lower-intermediate general education (3A) and lower-
intermediate vocational education (3B). 
For each skill group we estimate the equations using data on the proportion of workers 
trained, the hours spent on training, opportunity costs and incorporate other elements such 
as the direct costs and the proportion of training undertaken during working hours. 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the stocks of training, constructed by the methodology explained 
above for the EU countries considered in the report. We derived appropriate indices with a 
base of 100 in 2000. For the UK and the majority of other countries, the stock of 
training capital has been declining, or stagnating, since the financial crisis. This is 
explained primarily by in a fall in rates of participation in training rather than its duration or 
average costs. However, not all countries see a decline; in Germany the level of training 
remained quite stable and in countries such as Finland it has increased.  
Green et al. (2013) provide a comprehensive analysis of trends in job-related training in 
the UK. Using a variety of  individual and employer-based surveys,  they conclude that the 
volume of workplace training in the UK has indeed been falling over the last decade; this is 
in contrast with the developments during the 1990s when job-related training was on the 
rise. They stress that the cuts in training volumes are of concern as training emerges as an 
important factor for future prosperity. Their study also calls for an urgent improvement in 
the collection and presentation of statistics surrounding training and for a better 
understanding of both changes in training volumes and training quality. 
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 Figure 3.1.Training capital in EU countries (1995 prices, indexed 2000=100).  
 
Source: EU LFS, TED, EUKLEMS, and own calculations based on O'Mahony (2012a,2012b). 
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 3.2. Results of the growth accounting decomposition  
Main findings 
We present here the results of the growth accounting decomposition, and evaluate the 
changing role of different types of inputs to production, focusing on the changing role of 
skills. Within this framework, we also explore the roles of training and total factor 
productivity (TFP), in explaining total GDP growth.  
Table 3.1 presents the main summary of the contributions of a detailed number of factors 
of production to GDP growth during two distinct sub-periods: 2002-2007 and 2008-2013. 
We distinguish the extent to which these contributions have changed in response to the 
financial crisis, and analyse the UK case in relation to other major economies. 
The first two rows of table 3.1 present the average growth rates of GDP, by country, and 
sub-period. The following rows contain the percentage point contributions of the different 
factors of production. Table A.2.6 in the Appendix complements Table 3.1 by showing a 
more detailed account of developments following the financial crisis; we distinguish the  
years in the aftermath of the crisis (2008-2010) from the years of economic recovery 
(2011-2013).  
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 Table 3.1. Decomposition of GDP growth 2002-2013; two sub-periods. 
Finland France Germany Netherlands Sweden UK United States 
GDP 2002-2007 4.11 1.81 1.39 1.97 3.25 3.09 2.66 
(% change) 2008-2013 -0.53 0.11 0.68 -0.21 0.99 -0.31 0.97 
on which Percentage point contribution to average annual GDP growth 
Hours 2002-2007 0.79 0.20 -0.15 0.13 0.27 0.39 0.57 
2008-2013 -0.17 -0.07 0.24 0.06 0.28 0.14 -0.16 
Output per person hour 2002-2007 3.32 1.60 1.53 1.84 2.98 2.70 2.09 
2008-2013 -0.36 0.18 0.44 -0.26 0.71 -0.45 1.13 
of which 
Capital deepening 2002-2007 0.77 0.96 0.49 0.58 1.06 1.18 1.04 
2008-2013 0.66 0.77 0.59 0.47 1.12 0.76 0.64 
ICT capital 2002-2007 0.55 0.19 0.29 0.30 0.37 0.47 0.43 
2008-2013 0.40 0.14 0.42 0.21 0.57 0.23 0.37 
Non-ICT capital 2002-2007 0.23 0.77 0.21 0.28 0.69 0.71 0.62 
2008-2013 0.26 0.62 0.17 0.26 0.55 0.53 0.27 
TFP 2002-2007 2.18 0.25 0.85 0.60 1.67 0.98 0.78 
2008-2013 -1.36 -0.93 -0.45 -0.84 -0.58 -1.71 0.16 
Training 2002-2007 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.15 0.06 0.07 0.00 
2008-2013 0.05 -0.02 0.00 0.05 -0.02 -0.04 0.00 
Labour composition(Skills) 2002-2007 0.29 0.32 0.15 0.51 0.19 0.47 0.27 
2008-2013 0.29 0.36 0.29 0.05 0.19 0.54 0.33 
of which 
Higher 2002-2007 0.89 0.49 0.24 1.17 0.58 0.90 0.48 
2008-2013 0.99 0.63 0.34 0.38 0.68 1.16 0.54 
Upper-intermediate 2002-2007 -0.26 0.10 0.07 -0.43 0.11 0.05 0.05 
2008-2013 -0.22 0.27 0.31 -0.23 0.15 -0.02 0.12 
Lower-intermediate 2002-2007 0.16 0.30 -0.11 0.52 0.33 -0.02 -0.18 
2008-2013 -0.05 0.08 -0.20 -0.12 0.17 -0.05 -0.21 
Low 2002-2007 -0.50 -0.57 -0.06 -0.75 -0.83 -0.46 -0.08 
2008-2013 -0.44 -0.62 -0.15 0.03 -0.81 -0.55 -0.13 
Notes: US does not include training; Sweden contains data only from 2006, Finland from 2003. 
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To help illustrate the changes in the magnitudes of these contributions over time we also 
present the information in a stacked bar chart (see Figure 3.2 below for the UK; similar 
graphs are shown for the other countries analysed - see Figures A.2.8-A.2.13 in the 
Appendix).  
In these various charts, the average GDP growth rate achieved in each sub-period is 
labelled with the corresponding numerical figure and represented by a black diamond sign. 
In each period, the average GDP growth rate is the sum of all the production factors’ 
contributions plus the contribution of total factor productivity growth; that is the sum of all 
the coloured bars. The estimated contribution of labour composition, the main factor of 
interest in this study, is also labelled appropriately in the graphs.  
Figure 3.2. Growth contributions of labour, capital and productivity in United 
Kingdom (%), 2002-2013. 
Sources: Conference Board Total Economy Database (TED), UK LFS, own calculations. 
Here we describe the main findings. During the period 2002-2007, the UK economy grew 
at an average rate of just over 3% per year; which was largely explained by labour 
productivity gains (output per hour) (see Table 3.1). This rate was slightly higher than that 
in the US (2.7%) and considerably above the one France (1.8%) and Germany (1.4%). 
Only Finland (4.1%) and Sweden (3.3%) experienced higher output growth rates.  
The most important contributor to the UK's labour productivity growth in the years 
before the crisis was total factor productivity (representing over 30% of labour 
productivity growth), followed by the accumulation of capital assets. During this period, 
changes in workforce composition were also significant; the results indicate that the up-
skilling of the UK's workforce accounted for  around  20% of total labour 
productivity growth (labour composition represented 0.5 percentage points of total 
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 labour productivity growth). Reassuringly, these findings are in line with previous 
evidence (Timmer et al., 2010). 
The analysis for the period 2008-2013 captures the developments in the years following 
the financial and economic crisis of 2007-2008. The table shows that GDP remained 
largely flat in the UK, and the average growth rate was slightly negative at -0.3%. The 
analysis of the other countries also reveals weak output growth in France (0.1% per 
annum) and slightly better growth in Germany (0.7%). During this time, the economic 
outlook was more favourable for the United States and Sweden, with output growth rates 
of just below 1% per annum. 
In the aftermath of the crisis, the UK fared better in terms of employment than other major 
European countries (e.g. France), although it fared worse in terms of productivity. After 
2007, GDP contracted and total factor productivity growth turned negative. TFP thus 
appears to behave largely pro-cyclically, perhaps reflecting the changes in the speed of 
adjustment in the use of capital and labour inputs in response to the downturn (OECD, 
2012). This is consistent with the fact that TFP dropped sharply in the most severe years 
of the crisis  
The contribution of capital dropped after 2007. In the most recent years,  while the growth 
of traditional capital has slowed down, reflecting the tightening of credit conditions and the 
reduced investment efforts of firms, the growth of ICT capital has picked up again. The 
contribution of the raw labour input, in terms of amount of total hours worked, dropped to 
negative levels at the onset of the crisis (reflecting the effect of job losses)  but recovered 
substantially afterwards.  
The contribution of labour composition has remained positive through the whole 
period analysed, indicating an on-going increase in the average skill level of the 
UK's employed population. The calculations also reveal that the observed increase in 
the average level of skills of the workforce was more pronounced in the first years of the 
crisis (2008-2010) - see Table A.2.4 in the Appendix- than in the more recent period 
(2011-2013). Growth would have been significantly lower in the aftermath of the 
crisis, had it not been for improvements in labour composition. It is however 
important to exert caution when drawing conclusions derived from the analysis of a 
hypothetical scenario.  
During the period 2002-2007, the incidence of on-the-job training improved in the UK, and 
this is reflected in the positive contribution to productivity. However, since 2007, the 
contribution of training to labour productivity growth has been negative.  
The growth contribution from this type of intangible capital deepening seems to follow the 
general pattern for ICT capital, which was higher during 1995-2000 but declined later on. 
This is also observed for the US (Oliner et al., 2008), reflecting an explicit link between 
intangible capital and ICT capital.  
Table 3.1 and Figures A.2.8-13 contain details of the sources of GDP growth for the United 
States and the remaining EU countries. In addition, Figure 3.3 below shows the main 
contributions to growth in average labour productivity in each sub-period for each of the 
seven countries. 
The average GDP growth in the US between 2002-2007 was slightly lower than that in the 
UK (at 2.7%). The US had experienced the highest level of growth in an earlier period from 
the mid-1990s to early 2000s with the advent of the new ICTs. 
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 In the case of the United States45, the largest contributor to output growth during the first 
period of the sample was also total factor productivity growth. Similarly to the UK, this 
factor accounted for more than 30% of total labour productivity growth. Capital 
accumulation represented around half of  overall productivity growth (this was slightly 
larger than that in the UK) and larger employment gains contributed to faster output 
growth. During this period of expansion, however, the contribution of labour composition 
was smaller in the US than in the UK. The labour composition term, proxying for skill 
improvements, accounted for about 10% of average labour productivity growth.  
The financial crisis brought about slightly negative output growth during the period 2008-
2010, which was mainly explained by the fall in employment. Overall, GDP grew at just 
below 1% annually during 2008-2013. During this period the contribution of total factor 
productivity dropped substantially, but did not turn negative. By 2011-2013, the 
contributions of both employment and total factor productivity had recovered significantly. 
The contribution of skills has remained relatively stable throughout this period and even 
increased in the immediate aftermath of the crisis.  
Table 3.1 and Figures A.2.9-A.2.10 in the Appendix present the growth accounting 
decomposition for France and Germany. During the period 2002-2007, the average GDP 
growth rates in France (1.8%) and in Germany (1.4%) were lower than in the UK. Total 
factor productivity growth was just above zero in France, well below the growth rates 
achieved by the UK and US. The largest contribution to GDP growth in France came from 
non-ICT capital accumulation (over 40% of labour productivity growth). ICT capital 
accumulation, in contrast,  had a lesser role compared to the US and the UK. The 
contribution of labour composition was substantial in France. In Germany TFP growth was 
high and accounted for most of output growth. The contributions of both types of capital 
and labour composition were lower than in France, the UK and the US. 
During the period 2008-2013, total productivity growth declined at a rate of just below 1% 
per year on average in France; it declined at a faster rate at the initial stage of the crisis, 
and recovered in the following years. Capital accumulation has declined since 2007, 
although less intensively than in the UK. In Germany the TFP contribution also turned 
negative but by much less than in either the UK or France. ICT capital’s contribution 
increased, in contrast to most other countries. 
In France, the contribution of labour composition has remained quite stable (increasing 
slightly) throughout the crisis. The role played by training in France also deteriorated 
during the period 2008-2013 in comparison to the previous period; in fact it turned 
negative, suggesting a decrease in the incidence of on-the-job training during the years 
following the economic downturn. In Germany the contribution of labour composition  
improved. The contribution of training decreased, but remained slightly  positive. 
Similarly, Table 3.1 and Figures A.2.11-A.2.13 show detailed growth accounting 
decompositions for other countries of interest:  Finland, Netherlands and Sweden. During 
the period 2002-2007, GDP growth was robust in the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden 
(with rates ranging between 2% and 4% per year). During this period, the most important 
factor explaining growth in Finland was total factor productivity, representing around 50% 
of total output growth. In Netherlands the most important contribution came also from total 
45 Training is not considered in the growth accounting exercise for the United States.  
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 factor productivity gains, and also from changes in labour composition. In Sweden the 
employment gains were a strong growth driver.  
The contribution of skills to growth was quite small in Finland during 2002-2007; labour 
composition gains accounted for just below 8% of total output growth. It was significantly 
higher in the Netherlands. Total factor productivity growth turned negative during the 
period 2008-2010 in all these three countries; this was in sharp contrast to the significant 
productivity gains experienced in earlier years. Total factor productivity recovered 
somewhat during 2011-2013 but the growth rates remained close to zero.  
In all these three countries the contribution of capital decreased in response to the crisis, 
although to a smaller degree than in the UK. The contribution of labour composition has 
not changed significantly in Finland. The contribution of labour composition decreased in 
Netherlands and remained unchanged in Sweden during the latter period 2008-2013. 
Regarding training, its contribution to labour productivity growth decreased in response to 
the crisis in all three countries, with, however, only a very small decline in Finland.  
The growth accounting decomposition has shown that output and productivity growth 
remain weak in the UK; this is in contrast to the more favourable performance of the labour 
market. Output growth has remained weak in the other developed countries; the US 
experienced the fasted output and productivity recovery. As highlighted above, 
improvements in labour composition have mitigated this effect. 
The contribution of capital has decreased in all these countries since the recession, 
reflecting lower investment. Training has followed a decreasing or flat trend in all countries.  
To summarise, the main factor behind the labour productivity slowdown in the UK is 
negative total factor productivity growth. This is in contrast with the rapid growth in total 
factor productivity experienced during the late 1990s and early 2000s. Figure 3.3B 
highlights the different countries’ experience in the 2008-13 period. It shows clearly how 
the UK has under-performed the rest of these countries in terms of total factor productivity 
growth since the onset of recession.  
By contrast, the percentage point contribution of labour composition to growth in labour 
productivity during this period is highest of all the seven countries. We now go on to 
compare the different contributions of measured skills to labour productivity growth in each 
country in detail. 
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 Figure 3.3: Growth per annum in average labour productivity (output per person 
hour) and in the percentage point contributions to labour productivity growth of 
capital deepening, TFP, training and labour composition (skills) 
 
A: 2002-07 
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 Figure 3.3 (continued): Growth per annum in average labour productivity (output per 
person hour) and in the percentage point contributions to labour productivity 
growth of capital deepening, TFP, training and labour composition (skills) 
 
B: 2008-13 
 
 
Source: Derived from Table 3.1 
Note: Percentage point contributions may not sum exactly to total growth in output per 
person-hour due to rounding 
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 Detailed results: the contribution of skills to growth 
In this section we investigate in more detail the underlying components of the  "labour 
composition" term described in the previous section. Firstly, we break down the total 
labour composition effect into the effects attributed to four different types of educational-
based categories. The four skill groups considered are: "Higher skilled", "Upper-
intermediate skilled", "Lower-intermediate skilled" and "Lower skilled". This is shown in the 
lower panel of table 3.1. and in Figure 3.4 below. 
The sum of the contributions pertaining to all skills groups should equal the total labour 
composition term of the main growth accounting exercise. For example, in the case of the 
UK, the total labour composition term during 2008-2013 was 0.54 percentage points. This 
can be broken down into the contribution of the "High-skills" (1.16), "Upper-intermediate 
skills" (-0.02), "Lower-intermediate skills" (-0.05), and "Low skills" (-0.55) (see Figure 
3.4B). The signs of the labour composition terms are a reflection of the changes in 
employment shares accrued by each of the groups in the period of analysis.  
Changes in labour composition largely reflect the reallocation of market shares across 
skills groups. Although wages differentials are important, as they signal differences in 
productivity amongst type of workers, if the ratio of hours worked between high-skilled to 
low-skilled did not change over time, this would not translate to productivity improvements. 
By definition it is not possible for all skills to have a positive or all negative contribution). 
This is because the rise in the employment shares of some groups takes place at the 
expense of the shares in other groups.         
During the period 2002-2007, the increase in the level of skills contributed to just under 
20% of the overall labour productivity growth in the UK (just below half a percentage point, 
0.47). This contribution is above the contribution made by skills in the US and the 
contribution of skills in other European countries. In France the up-skilling of the workforce 
also  contributed  around 20% of France's total labour productivity growth. The contribution 
of skills to labour productivity growth was high in the Netherlands and lower, on average, 
in other countries such as Finland (9%) and Sweden (Figure 3.4A). 
The higher-skilled group accounted for the largest contribution to labour 
productivity growth during the period 2002-2007. This is consistent with the robust 
increase in the share of graduates in the UK's workforce since the early 2000s. The 
contribution of the higher-skilled group to labour productivity growth was also positive in 
the US, but of lower magnitude than that in the UK. The importance of higher-skills in 
countries like Finland and France was also relatively strong.  
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 Figure 3.4: Growth per annum in the percentage point contributions to labour 
productivity growth of labour composition (skills) and in the four categories of skill 
 
A: 2002-07 
 
 
(Continued on next page) 
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 Figure 3.4 (continued): Growth per annum in the percentage point contributions to 
labour productivity growth of labour composition (skills) and in the four categories 
of skill 
B: 2008-13 
 
 
 
Source: Derived from Table 3.1 
Note: Percentage point contributions may not sum exactly to total growth in labour 
composition due to rounding 
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 During the period 2008-2013, the contribution of higher-skills to labour productivity growth 
has continued to increase in the UK. The contribution increased in the immediate years of 
the recession and then declined slightly; it is now at similar pre-crisis levels. This is in stark 
contrast to overall productivity performance, which has followed a downward trend. In the 
US, France and Germany, the contribution of higher academic type skills also increased in 
absolute terms. This was also the case in countries like Sweden and Finland.  
The second group we consider is the upper-intermediate skill group, which accounts for 
just above 10% of the total UK's workforce (as we have seen in section 2). The 
contribution of this group was positive to 2007 but has seen a decrease in the total 
employment share since. The contribution of this skill group was also negative  in 
Netherlands and Finland in the two sub-periods, which indicates a decrease in the 
incidence of this type of skills in these two economies. However it has been positive in US, 
Germany and France. 
The third group analysed is the "lower-intermediate" skill group. The contribution was 
positive in the UK during 2002-2007, but turned negative in 2008-2013, indicating a lower 
share of workers with this type of qualifications in the total workforce. This is expected 
considering the decrease in the number of workers with low-level qualifications. Consistent 
with the UK, in the majority of countries the contribution of this skill group deteriorated in 
the second time period. In the US the contribution was negative throughout the whole 
period analysed, as a smaller proportion of the US' workforce has lower intermediate skills.  
The contribution of the "lower-skill" group is negative in the UK, as expected, and this has 
not changed greatly throughout the whole period. The contribution of this group is negative 
in all major countries reflecting the decreases in the proportion of the workforce with no or 
very low qualifications, the one exception being a slight positive contribution in the 
Netherlands in the 2008-13 period. It is however less negative in the US compared to the 
UK and also France.  
Table 3.2 below shows the labour composition terms for five skill groups for the UK 
only. Using more detailed employment shares from the UK Labour Force Survey, we are 
able to distinguish the labour productivity contributions of lower-intermediate vocational 
skills  (for example NVQ3, trade apprenticeships) from the contribution made by lower-
intermediate general skills (for example, A-level or equivalent).  
We can see that the contribution of lower-intermediate vocational skills has been negative 
throughout the whole period of analysis.  In contrast, the contribution of the lower-
intermediate general skill groups, which was positive during 2002-2007 turned negative in 
the later period. We can observe that in the period 2008-2013 the contribution of labour 
composition in all groups but one (the high-skilled), has been negative. This reflects the 
rapid increases in the proportion of the workers with high-level qualifications.  
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 Table 3.2. Detailed labour composition contributions in the UK; five skill groups. 
Contributions of labour 
composition by skills 
2002-2007 2008-2013 
High- skills 0.90 1.16 
Upper-intermediate skills 0.05 -0.02 
Lower-intermediate vocational 
skills 
-0.08 -0.04 
Lower-intermediate general skills 0.07 -0.01 
Low-skills -0.46 -0.54 
Source: UK Labour Force Survey.  
 
 
The growth accounting exercise has also shown that in a context of weak 
productivity growth, the improvement of skills has continued to make a positive 
contribution to output. The contribution of labour composition rose markedly in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis, as job losses were concentrated amongst the less skilled. 
This has mainly been driven by the fact that those with a higher education qualification 
now represent an increasing share of the workforce. A higher proportion of the UK's 
workforce has a university degree, and a lower proportion has upper-intermediate, lower-
intermediate or low or no qualifications. This occurs despite some reduction in the wage 
premium paid to the high skilled, possibly reflecting the fact that, as UK graduates have 
moved in larger numbers into occupations which did not traditionally require university 
degrees as entry qualifications, some evidence is pointing to a widening dispersion of 
returns to degree-level study, with much lower earnings for graduates who regard 
themselves as ‘overqualified’ for the jobs they hold (Green and Zhu, 2010). 
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 4. Econometric Analysis 
4.1. Methodology 
The econometric approach is developed from an equivalent production function framework 
to the growth accounting exercise. As shown in previous sections, total factor productivity 
growth, the residual of the growth accounting setup, accounts for a large part of labour 
productivity growth differences across countries. A key aim of an econometric approach is 
to further our understanding of the sources of the ‘unexplained' part of total labour 
productivity growth.  
The main advantage of the econometric approach over the growth accounting approach is 
that it allows us to investigate the role of additional factors that may have an impact on 
growth, such as intangibles and skills formation, independently, or in combination with 
traditional inputs to production. 
An econometric approach, both at an aggregate and at industry level, has been 
extensively used in the literature to explain productivity developments over the last twenty 
years. From the mid-1990s onwards, a broad consensus emerged about the key role 
played by information and communications technology in the productivity resurgence of 
the UK, the US and other developed economies. More importantly, econometric studies 
contributed to uncovering the determinants of  total factor productivity gains, which were 
observed both within and outside the ICT production sector. ICT’s role as a General 
Purpose Technology and the increase in ICT-related innovations helped explain the TFP 
surge in the wider economy, mainly in market services sectors. Examples of industry-level 
studies included Stiroh (2002), Nordhaus (2002), Bosworth and Triplett (2007), O'Mahony 
and Vecchi (2005) and Basu et al. (2003). For more detailed references to the industry-
level literature in Europe, see Timmer et al. (2010) and van Ark and Inklaar (2005).  
From the mid-2000s, the contributions to growth from both the production and the use of IT 
declined but total factor productivity growth continued to be a major productivity driver in 
the US although not in post-recession Europe (see Figure 3.3B above). Since then a 
growing body of studies has stressed the importance of intangible assets to explaining 
growth developments and their potential to generate spillovers (See Corrado et al., 2014; 
Corrado et al. 2013; Corrado et al., 2012). Research has found that intangible capital 
accounts for one fifth to one third of labour productivity growth in the market sector of the 
US and EU economies (Corrado et al., 2013). 
Corrado et al. (2014) are pioneers in introducing explicit measures of intangible capital in 
industry-based cross-country econometric analysis to investigate the channels by which 
intangibles affect productivity. Prior studies had been more limited by the lack of 
comprehensive data on intangible investments, and the links with economic growth were 
investigated mainly through R&D, or inferred from assumed correlations with ICT 
investment. In the usual growth accounting framework, Corrado et al. (2014) find that the 
marginal impact of ICT capital is higher when complemented with intangible capital.  
In the present econometric analysis we rely on industry-level data for the group of 
countries of interest, available for the period 1995-2010. Our main variables of interest are 
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 related to human capital accumulation, both in relation to certified skills (through the 
education system) and uncertified skills (developed through on-the-job training).  
We are able to exploit differences in the growth rate of the different inputs across 
industries, countries and time, including the period of the financial crisis, to identify the 
contribution of the different factors to output growth.  
Our econometric model is based on a basic production function specification such as (all 
variables in logs):  
∆𝑦𝑦𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝛼𝛼𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙∆𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖∆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖∆𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝜖𝜖𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐               
               (4.1) 
     
where ∆yjct is the growth rate of real value added in industry j of country c between year t 
and year t-1, ∆ictkjct, ∆nictkjct and ∆ljct are the growth rate of ICT capital, non-ICT capital 
and labour input respectively.  
We first estimate this model in differences where we take the log difference (∆) of each 
variable in equation (4.1) between two consecutive years. This type of transformation is 
useful because, firstly, it allows the interpretation of the estimated parameters as output 
elasticities to the factors of production. Secondly, the regressions in differences minimize 
the risk that unobserved factors, correlated with both inputs and output choices, yield 
inconsistent estimates of the models’ parameters.  
This specification is very similar to that of equation (3.1) from the growth accounting 
exercise. In the growth accounting analysis, however, we impose the value of the factor 
shares and derive TFP growth as a residual. Here, instead, we estimate the factor shares 
econometrically.  
Estimates of the βs and the γs parameters are obtained by regressing model (4.1) on the 
pooled sample of industries observed over the period 1995-2010 across different 
countries. The estimated β parameters in this model should be interpreted as the average 
growth contribution of these factors across industries and countries over the observation 
period 1995-2010. This is dictated by data availability in the EUKLEMS framework with 
cross-country information on output and input measures at industry level currently 
available only up to 2010 and on a pre ESA2010 basis.  
In addition we include fixed effects, which enable us to control for additional sources of 
unobserved heterogeneity in productivity performance. In particular, the terms αct and αjt 
now represent the country-year specific and industry-year specific fixed effects, and they 
are included in the model to control for unobserved time-varying factors common to all 
industries within a country, or common to the same industry across different countries 
(such as technology shocks). The error term ϵjct captures country-industry specific shocks, 
such as demand shocks, and changes in multifactor productivity.  
The right-hand side of equation (4.1) is then augmented with a number of additional inputs: 
e.g. the training stock (TRAINKjct) and the R&D stock (RDKjct) accumulated over time by 
the companies populating each industry-country cell. Other measures of intangible assets 
are subsequently included in the model.  
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 These baseline estimates are likely to hide substantial heterogeneity across industries, 
countries and time. It is indeed conceivable that the growth of ICT capital may contribute in 
a different way to the growth of output and labour productivity across industries with 
different technological characteristics and different skill compositions of the workforce. To 
explore these types of heterogeneous effects, the set of explanatory variables in equation 
(4.1) is augmented with the inclusion of interactions between the original terms and 
selected variables identifying specific industry or country characteristics yielding an 
equation of the form of  (4.2) below.  
Differences in skill intensity and intangible-assets intensity across industries and countries 
are considered by including in both specifications the interactions between the input terms 
and several indicators of intangible capital (intanin). For example, the sign and the 
magnitude of the parameters βictkskill and βnictkskill, indicate whether these factors of 
production provide a greater or smaller  contribution to UK industries’ output growth than to 
the output growth  of the same industries in the other countries included in the sample. 
∆𝑦𝑦𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝛼𝛼𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙∆ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖∆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖∆𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙�∆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ×
𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙� + 𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙�∆𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 × 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙� + 𝜖𝜖𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐             
                   (4.2) 
=
A second version of the model can be estimated in terms of labour productivity, where all 
terms are now growth rates of inputs and output per hour worked. This specification 
enables us to investigate more specifically the relationship between  ICT capital 
deepening, non-ICT capital deepening and productivity: 
∆ �
 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡
ℎ𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡
� = 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝛼𝛼𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 + 𝛾𝛾𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 ∆ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ∆ � 𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 � + 𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖∆ � 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 � + 𝜖𝜖𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐               
             
          (4.3) 
In addition to estimating a specification in differences we use a specification in levels 
where we include, along with other measures of intangible investments,  employment skill 
shares as right-hand side regressors, as in: 
 
�
 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡
ℎ𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡
� = 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝛼𝛼𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 � 𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 � + 𝛾𝛾𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 � 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 � + %ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 +  %𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 +%𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + %𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝜖𝜖𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐   
           (4.4) 
where 
 𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡
ℎ𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡
 is our measures of ICT-capital deepening; 
 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡
ℎ𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡
 is our measure of non-
ICT capital deepening; %ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ refers to the percentage of workers with at least a bachelor 
degree, %𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 refers to the percentage of the workers with at least an upper-
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 intermediate qualification, and %𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑤𝑤𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 is the percentage of workers with lower-
intermediate qualifications; %intanin denotes the indicators of intangible investments, 
which are measured as a share of total output. 
Data construction issues 
The basic set of variables included in the production function econometric estimations are 
extracted from the latest data release of the EUKLEMS database. For the specification in 
differences, we use the input and output quantity indices46 available according to the 
classification of economic activities NACE Rev. 2. In compiling the database we faced 
significant data constraints. Capital services47 indices were not separately available for ICT 
capital and non-ICT capital assets for a number of countries (e.g. US, Sweden), and 
therefore we were not able to test the relative contribution of these two kinds of capital 
using these data. Given the important role of ICT assets in driving productivity, we opted 
for constructing our measure of ICT and non-ICT capital stocks, using the underlying 
investment and deflator information available on a country-by country basis in EUKLEMS.  
Starting from the EUKLEMS series on investment in different categories of assets, we use 
the Perpetual Inventory Method (PIM) to estimate capital stocks at each point in time. By 
cumulating gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) year by year and deducting retirements, 
we follow the methodology of Hall and Mairesse (1995) and Griliches (1980) to obtain the 
initial capital stock at the industry level from the first observation available for investment: Kjc(t=0)d = Ijc(t=0)dg�jcd +  δjcd  
where Ijc(t=0)d  is the initial investment in asset type d in industry-country pairs jc.  g�jcd  and δjcd  
are respectively the country-industry specific average growth rates of investment in asset d 
over the whole period of observation, and the asset-specific depreciation rate. Once we 
obtain the initial capital stock we reconstruct series according to the following PIM formula: 
 Kjc(t+1)d =   Ijc(t+1)d + �Kjc(t)d × (1 − δjcd )�. 
 
EUKLEMS reports investment for eight categories of capital assets. We sum the PIM 
capital stocks of computing equipment, communications equipment and software to obtain ICTKjct. The stock of Non-ICT capital assets  NICTKjct is obtained by summing the total 
PIM stocks of transport equipment, other machinery and equipment, total non-residential 
investment, residential structures and other assets.  
We follow the same approach (PIM) to estimate the stock of R&D capital, but in the 
absence of country-asset specific depreciation rates we assume a common depreciation 
46 See O’Mahony and Timmer (2009) for details on the construction of the output and input indices. 
We take the log difference of each index between two consecutive periods to approximate the rate of 
growth of the factor of production between periods.  
 
47 Capital services indices measure the flow of productive services from capital assets to production 
and can be obtained as a proportion of the capital stocks.  
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 rate of 15% per year. Data on R&D investment are obtained from the INTAN-Invest 
Dataset (Corrado et al., 2012).  
The level of real value added (yjct) is computed starting from the nominal value-added 
series and using country-industry specific output price indices downloaded from the 
EUKLEMS Basic Files. The total labour input Ljct is now the total number of hours (in 
millions) worked by persons engaged in a particular industry. 
Another important issue that constrained us is related to the fact that, in the latest data 
released from EUKLEMS, some data are reported inconsistently across countries. We lose 
an important number of observations when we compute our own capital stocks, as some 
countries do not provide detailed information on investment by asset type; two out of six 
countries in the sample do not provide this detailed  information.  The number of 
observations is thus lower than originally anticipated, and this may limit the number of right 
hand side regressors that we can include at the same time. Overall, however, we feel that 
there are sufficient observations to provide a reliable picture of the main determinants of 
productivity growth.   
 
4.2. Some descriptive statistics 
Table 4.1 below contains summary statistics for the different variables included in our 
model.  Our dataset is organized along three dimensions: countries, industries and time. 
Means and standard deviations are shown in the table for countries as a whole and table 
4.2 contains the summary statistics for 1-digit industries (NACE Rev.2).  
Table 4.1 shows overall output growth for all industries in the countries considered. During 
the period 1995-2010 output growth was highest in Finland (2.7% per annum on average), 
followed by the UK (2.1%) and Netherlands (2.0%). Growth in the stock of ICT capital was 
also higher in Finland (9% per annum) followed by the UK (7%); the growth in the stock of 
R&D capital was the lowest in the UK.  
Table 4.2 reports similar statistics, summarising the outcomes across the different 
industries. Taking all countries together, we observe that those industries that experienced 
a higher growth were in the service sector (professional, scientific and administrative 
support activities (3.1% per annum on average), wholesale and retail (2.9%), and 
information and communication activities (6.6%). 
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 Table 4.1: Summary statistics of the variables by country, 1995-2010. 
         ∆𝑦𝑦𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ∆𝐿𝐿 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ∆𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴 𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ∆ 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇 𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ∆𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐾𝐾𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ∆𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐾𝐾𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 
Finland 
 
 
0.027 0.015 0.004 0.099 0.097 0.047 
 
 
(0.067) (0.036) (0.074) (0.064) (0.082) (0.115) 
Germany 0.005 -0.004 0.007 0.082 0.050 -0.020 
(0.062 (0.033) (0.035) (0.103) (0.052) (0.024) 
Netherlands 0.020 0.007 0.027 0.078 0.072 0.010 
(0.047) (0.035) (0.045) (0.070) (0.065) (0.037) 
UK 0.021 0.005 0.054 0.038 0.088 0.020 
(0.047) (0.038) (0.045) (0.080) (0.077) (0.042) 
Total 0.019 0.006 0.023 0.075 0.077 0.016 
  (0.057) (0.036) (0.056) (0.083) (0.072) (0.071) 
     
Notes. The table reports the mean and the standard deviation (in parentheses) of the variables in columns 
for each of the four countries in the estimation sample (regressions with PIM capital) and for the total sample 
across countries. 
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 Table 4.2: Summary statistics of the variables by industry48, 1995-2010. 
             ∆𝑦𝑦𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ∆𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ∆𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ∆𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  ∆𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐾𝐾𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ∆𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐾𝐾𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 
Mining -0.013 -0.022 -0.008 -0.016 0.055 0.011 
 (0.118) (0.065) (0.095) (0.083) (0.127) (0.068) 
Manufacturing 0.014 -0.017 0.012 0.045 0.053 0.037 
 (0.072 (0.030) (0.031) (0.036) (0.042) (0.118) 
Electricity, gas, steam, 
and air conditioning 
0.017 -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 0.070 0.035 
(0.037) (0.035) (0.058) (0.096) (0.045) (0.012) 
Construction 0.001 0.003 0.017 0.050 0.077 0.046 
 (0.051) (0.037) (0.065) (0.124) (0.083) (0.071) 
Wholesale and retail 
trade, repair of motor 
vehicles 
0.029 0.002 0.022 0.096 0.082 0.018 
(0.038) (0.018) (0.035) (0.092) (0.055) (0.028) 
Transport and storage 0.017 0.003 0.034 0.105 0.051 0.020 
 0.040) (0.017) (0.051) (0.054) (0.045) (0.034) 
Accommodation and 
food 
service activities 
0.013 0.011 0.034 0.105 0.083 0.020 
(0.046) (0.027) (0.051) (0.054) (0.062) (0.032) 
Information and  
communication 
0.066 0.025 0.034 0.105 0.053 0.057 
(0.062) (0.045) (0.051) (0.054) (0.072) (0.026) 
Finance and insurance 0.023 0.000 0.025 - 0.058 -0.052 
 (0.056) (0.028) (0.045) - (0.060) (0.174) 
Real estate 0.022 0.020 0.034 0.105 0.126 0.020 
 (0.018) (0.030) (0.051) (0.054) (0.088) (0.024) 
Professional, scientific, 
administrative and 
support 
0.031 0.029 0.034 0.105 0.107 0.028 
(0.049 (0.028) (0.051) (0.054) (0.068) (0.036) 
Arts, entertainment  and  
recreation 
0.017 0.021 0.034 0.105 0.101 -0.001 
(0.030 (0.027) (0.051) (0.054) (0.058) (0.025) 
Other service activities 0.014 0.013 0.034 0.105 0.091 0.004 
 (0.025 (0.024) (0.051) (0.054) (0.054) (0.040) 
Total 0.019 0.007 0.023 0.075 0.078 0.016 
 (0.057)  (0.037) (0.056)  (0.083) (0.073) (0.072) 
Notes: The table reports the means and the standard deviations (in parentheses) of the variables in columns 
for each sector in the estimation sample. Estimates in the total row may differ from those shown in Table 4.1 
due to rounding. 
 
Next we present an analysis of variance applied to the skills variables; this allow us to 
understand, from the outset, the extent to which differences in skill shares of the labour 
48 Based on Nace Rev.2 classification of economic activities. 
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 force are explained by country factors and/or industry factors. First of all we estimate three 
OLS models on each of the variables of interest. Each model includes a different set of 
dummy variables representing countries, industries and years. Adjusted R-squares from 
these regressions are reported in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4.   
With the exception of the share of higher-skilled workers, which is mostly accounted for by 
industry characteristics, the shares of the other skill groups are mostly explained by 
country-level characteristics. This preliminary analysis suggests that the same industry 
may have very different proportions of workers with these three education levels across 
the countries, which will be key when identifying effects in the full regression models. 
The year dummies, in contrast, have very little explanatory power, suggesting that 
differences in the skill composition of the workforce across countries and industries vary 
little over the period considered. 
 
Table 4.3: Decomposition of variance of the skill employment shares.  
 Higher skills Upper-
intermediate sills 
Lower-
intermediate skills 
Lower skills 
Country 0.04 0.26 0.61 0.28 
Industry 0.66 0.12 0.08 0.37 
Year 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.08 
Notes. The table reports the adjusted R2 obtained by regressing the share of each skill group (in columns) 
on the different set of dummy variables corresponding to the dimensions reported in rows. 
 
We can do similar analysis of variance using our indicators of intangible investment. 
Industry-level characteristics account for the largest share of variations in the asset 
composition of intangible capital, and this holds across the different categories of 
intangible assets considered. 
Table 4.4: Decomposition of variance of key intangible asset shares 
  
Total 
Intangibles Software R&D 
Intellectual 
property 
Country 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.05 
Industry 0.66 0.81 0.65 0.49 
Year -0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 
Notes. The table reports the adjusted R2 obtained by regressing the share of each asset group(in columns) 
on different set of dummy variables  corresponding to the dimensions reported in rows. 
 
4.3. Econometric results 
We first report the results of estimating the production function outlined in (4.1)-(4.3) in 
differences. We show the results of both the output and the labour productivity 
specifications, where we measure output and capital per units of labour; See table 4.5.  
We also report the results when using a variety of standard panel data estimation 
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 methods, such as Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Random effects (RE) and Fixed effects 
(FE) estimation techniques.  
The coefficients for capital, range between just below 0.1 and just below 0.3 depending on 
the estimation technique used. The coefficients can be interpreted as the output elasticities 
of factor inputs. An elasticity of 0.1 implies that a 1% increase in the amount of ICT capital 
input will translate to a 0.1% increase in output. In line with results found in the production 
function literature the coefficients on the non-ICT capital factor are largest in magnitude. 
When using random effects and OLS models, the estimated coefficients for ICT-capital 
show a positive and significant coefficient of 0.10 (as a maximum);  the coefficients are a 
little smaller and not statistically significant when estimating the models using fixed effects. 
The coefficient on the labour variable, when we look at the output specification, is in line 
with predictions (around 0.4).This indicates that  a 1% increase in the total labour input will 
yield a 0.4% increase in output.  
The crucial identification of the Random Effect (RE) estimator is that the regressors are not 
systematically correlated with the error term. After log-differencing the variables and 
introducing industry-year and country-year specific dummies to control for αct and αjt this 
assumption may be tenable. The FE estimator, however, removes from the error term the 
component explained by time-invariant country-industry factors (i.e. by subtracting from 
each observation the mean computed at the industry-country level). This transformation of 
the variables reduces the risk of endogeneity arising from omitted variable bias. This 
comes at the expense of the efficiency of the estimates, and it explains the higher 
standard error of FE estimates when compared to RE estimates.  
Under valid assumptions, the Random Effects estimator is more efficient than the Fixed-
Effects or OLS, thus delivering more precise estimates. However, if the assumptions are 
not valid, the Random Effects will be inconsistent and therefore the Fixed Effects estimator 
would be preferred. We perform a Hausman statistical test, which is often used to 
discriminate between Fixed Effects and Random Effects models; in particular, we use the 
test  to evaluate the consistency of a RE estimator compared to the FE estimator, which is 
less efficient but is known to be consistent.  
In general, when we estimate equations 4.1-4.3, the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and 
Random Effect (RE) models generate very similar parameters on the non-ICT capital and 
the labour variable. When we compare Random Effects with Fixed Effects we see that the 
coefficient for the non-ICT capital is larger in the FE model (although not statistically 
significant in the output specification).  In contrast, the FE parameter on ICT-capital is 
considerably smaller than the RE effect. The lower precision of the FE estimates 
compared to RE estimates may explain why the FE coefficient on the ICT capital variable 
tends to be statistically insignificant (in both output and labour productivity specifications). 
A possible explanation for this finding is that variations in ICT-capital are positively 
correlated with unobserved time-invariant industry-country level factors that foster value 
added growth. This may suggest the existence of unobserved factors positively correlated 
with faster growth in ICT assets (e.g. innovation). 
The results for the ICT variable are consistent with industry-based studies looking at the 
returns associated with the ICT technology and in line with prior expectations on the 
impact of ICT capital on output growth. Earlier econometric studies often failed to obtain 
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 significant results for the ICT capital variable, and sometimes even a negative coefficient. 
This was attributed for example, to a delay in the implementation of complementary 
investments deemed necessary to reap the benefits of the ICT technology (O'Mahony and 
Vecchi, 2005).   
The results of the Hausman test49 (performed on a simple output and labour productivity 
specification) show that both FE and RE estimators are consistent but the RE estimator 
should be preferred due to its higher efficiency. From this table on, we will focus on the RE 
estimates.  
Table 4.5. Baseline models, estimation in differences (capital with PIM), 1995-2010. 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 Dependent:    𝑂𝑂𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖     𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦 
 Estimator: OLS RE FE   OLS RE FE 
 ICT capital  0.078 0.078*** 0.039 ICT per labour 0.101** 0.101*** 0.074 
 (0.051) (0.024) (0.035)  (0.050) (0.031) (0.044) 
Non-ICT capital 0.104** 0.104** 0.113 Non- ICT 
capital per 
labour 
0.192*** 0.192*** 0.283*** 
 (0.052) (0.048) (0.078)  (0.065) (0.069) (0.101) 
Labour  0.422*** 0.422*** 0.406***  - - - 
 (0.142) (0.124) (0.127)  - - - 
Country-year FE  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-year FE  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
R2 within   0.622 0.623     0.540 0.543 
R2 between  0.900 0.072   0.760 0.016 
R2 overall  0.659 0.087   0.560 0.096 
Groups  40 40   40 40 
Obs. 579 579 579   579 579 579 
Notes. Cluster robust standard errors reported in parentheses (clustering unit: country). Significance levels: 
***.01, **.05, *.1. Estimation sample: countries (UK, Finland, Germany, Netherland), years (1996-2010).  
Note: OLS= Ordinary Least Squares; RE=Random Effects, FE=Fixed effects.  
From a qualitative perspective, we obtain very similar results when we estimate the more 
complete equation (4.2). We find that both ICT and non-ICT capital contribute to 
productivity growth in line with prior expectations; the contribution of ICT capital, however, 
is not significant once we account for industry-country fixed effects and time dummies.  
49 We perform a Hausman test between two estimators, a RE estimator and FE estimator, in a simple 
specification without country*year and industry*year dummies. By using such specification we are 
incurring in a higher risk of inconsistency of the RE estimates but we are re-assured that it will hold 
when using a specification with the full set of dummies. The Hausman test result of the main output 
specification yields a insignificant P-value, larger than 0.05 ( Prob >Chi2=0.5818). This result 
indicates that the null hypothesis (“the differences between RE and FE are not systematic; both 
estimators are consistent) cannot be rejected).  
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 In Table 4.6, we also explore the additional contribution of intangible investments, namely 
R&D capital (∆RDKjct) and training capital  (∆TRAINKjct) to value added and productivity 
growth (col 1 and col. 5). As the results of the Hausman test were  satisfactory, we report 
here the main results from the Random Effects models.   
Next we look at the different contributions of the factors in sectors that use higher-skilled 
workers more intensively, and in sectors with higher intensity of intangible assets (col. 3, 
col. 4 col. 7, and col. 8) In addition, we explore the heterogeneous contribution of each 
factor of production in the UK (col. 2 and col. 6) vis-à-vis the three other countries in the 
estimation sample.  
The regression results indicate that neither training nor R&D stock contribute to value-
added growth (i.e., insignificant estimates in col.1); however the results emerging from the 
labour productivity specification do support the notion that training has a sizeable and 
significant effect on labour productivity. The estimated coefficient in col. 5 suggests that a 
10% increase in training capital per worker is associated with a 2% increase in labour 
productivity.  
Moving to the heterogeneity arising from industry characteristics, we find that industries 
with greater skill intensity benefit disproportionally from the growth in training capital (i.e., 
positive coefficient on  ∆Training  capitaljct × SKILLjct   in col. 3 and col. 7). This result 
suggests that training has a greater return in industries with a greater proportion of highly 
qualified workers. We also find some weaker evidence (i.e., significant only at the 10% 
level) that training makes a greater contribution to value added growth in industries that 
use intangible assets more intensively. 
Interactions with the UK dummy variable are generally insignificant, suggesting a similar 
contribution of the inputs in the UK and in other countries (col. 2 and col. 6). However, 
there are two noticeable exceptions to this pattern. First, we find that the growth of hours 
worked ∆Employment contributed less to value added growth in the UK than in the other 
countries (i.e., negative coefficient on ∆Employmentjct × UK in col. 2). Second, we find that 
over the period 1996-2010 non-ICT capital growth provided a greater contribution to 
productivity growth in the UK than in the comparison countries (i.e., positive coefficient on  (Non − ICT capital per employee) × UK in col. 6).   
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 Table 4.6: Random-Effect Panel models with interaction terms and additional inputs; Estimation in differences, 1995-2010. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent: Growth in output  Growth in output per employee 
Interaction term: - 𝑉𝑉 = 𝑈𝑈𝐾𝐾𝑐𝑐    𝑉𝑉 = 𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑉𝑉 = 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 
 
- 𝑉𝑉 = 𝑈𝑈𝐾𝐾𝑐𝑐      𝑉𝑉 = 𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑉𝑉 = 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 
ICT capital 0.078*** 0.058 0.231* -0.034 
ICT capital per 
employee 0.092*** 0.069* 0.180 -0.049 
 
(0.023) (0.045) (0.136) (0.054) 
 
(0.025) (0.040) (0.122) (0.101) 
Non-ICT capital 0.102** 0.103** 0.205 -0.026 
Non-ICT capital per 
employee 0.154*** 0.131*** 0.279** 0.269 
 
(0.040) (0.048) (0.145) (0.180) 
 
(0.045) (0.039) (0.117) (0.258) 
Employment 0.374*** 0.465*** 0.253*** 0.358*** 
 
- - - - 
 
(0.131) (0.121) (0.081) (0.119) 
 
- - - - 
R&D capital 0.003 -0.001 -0.061 0.126 
R&D capital per 
employee 0.033 0.034 -0.010 0.088* 
 
(0.013) (0.038) (0.073) (0.079) 
 
(0.042) (0.058) (0.112) (0.050) 
Training capital 0.119 0.130* -0.144 0.038 
Training per 
employee 0.219*** 0.187* -0.021 0.248* 
 
(0.101) (0.070) (0.171) (0.112) 
 
(0.070) (0.103) (0.237) (0.136) 
       ICT Capital *V - 0.094 -0.529 0.970* 
ICT Capital per 
employee *V - 0.055 -0.339 1.228 
 
- (0.101) (0.400) (0.566) 
 
- (0.100) (0.384) (0.971) 
Non-ICT Capital *V - 0.003 -0.005 1.110 
Non-ICT Capital per 
employee *V - 0.113** 0.188 -0.918 
 
- (0.050) (0.618) (1.491) 
 
- (0.046) (0.640) (1.953) 
Employment *V - -0.267** - - 
 
- - - - 
 
- (0.111) - - 
 
- - - - 
R&D capital *V - -0.006 -0.005 -1.540 
R&D capital per 
employee *V - -0.003 -0.006 -0.709 
 
- (0.026) (0.299) (1.082) 
 
- (0.041) (0.196) (0.912) 
Training*V - -0.105 1.004** 0.904* 
Training per 
employee*V - 0.025 1.039*** 0.011 
 
- (0.263) (0.441) (0.536) 
 
- (0.222) (0.363) (0.879)            𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐−1 
  
0.108** -0.002  𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐−1 
  
0.087** -0.022 
   
(0.054) (0.086) 
   
(0.039) (0.106) 
Country-year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
Industry-year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 within 0.624 0.631 0.698 0.631 
 
0.555 0.561 0.644 0.559 
R2 between 0.903 0.888 0.883 0.920 
 
0.788 0.764 0.729 0.796 
R2 overall 0.661 0.666 0.720 0.670 
 
0.576 0.578 0.653 0.580 
Groups 40 40 40 40 
 
40 40 40 40 
Obs. 579 579 418 579 
 
579 579 418 579 
 
 
 
Notes. Cluster robust standard errors reported in parentheses (clustering unit: country). Significance levels: ***.01, **.05, *.1. Estimation sample: countries (UK, Finland, 
Germany, Netherland), years (1996-2010), Industries Nace rev. 2 ( B, C, D-E, F, G, H, I, J, L, M-N, R),  
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 Next, we estimate a specification in levels (variables always in logs) where we can 
investigate the role of different types of skills in a production function framework;  shares of 
employment by skill group are now added as additional right hand side variables.  
Given that we have distinguished four categories of skills, we include three skill categories 
in the regressions; this is because the sum of the shares equals 100 and including them all 
at once would cause them to be perfectly collinear. 
The first set of results is presented in table 4.7a. In the most basic model of labour 
productivity (columns 1 (OLS), column 2 (RE), and column 3 (FE)) we estimate the impact 
of capital per employee, along with the impact of the overall training capital per employee 
and the skills variables. The estimated elasticities of the capital variables in levels are of 
similar magnitude to those of the estimation in differences (around 0.2). The coefficients of 
ICT capital, however, are a little higher. The coefficients for the training capital deepening 
variable (that is overall training per employees) are positive and significant.  
These results show that having a higher proportion of high-skills is associated with 
higher productivity outcomes. The effect of the high-skill variable is positive and 
significant across different specifications. The only estimation where high-level skills 
are not significant is the FE estimation, as all the country-by-industry fixed effects are likely 
to absorb a large part of the variation in the observed skills shares. As we saw earlier in 
section 4.2, the skill shares vary more along the country and industry dimensions and less 
over time The estimated effect for the high-skilled variable emerging from the RE 
estimation is 0.2. This suggests, that ceteris paribus, a 10% increase in the share of the 
workforce with at least a bachelor degree should increase productivity by 2%.  
The estimated effect of the upper-intermediate skill variable is less clear cut and while the 
coefficients are positive, they are not always significant. Using OLS, we do observe that 
the coefficient is positive and significant, but of lower magnitude than that of the high-skill 
variable, as we would expect. Unsurprisingly, we also find that having a higher percentage 
of lower-intermediate skill workers is associated with less productivity.  
Training per employee is also positively associated with productivity outcomes. The 
coefficient of the training variable of the FE estimation suggests that a 10% increase in the 
total amount of training variable per employee will increase productivity by 2%. Using an 
RE model the training effect would increase by 3.4% (see column  5 in table 4.7a below).  
Finally, when we interact training with the skill variables, we see a positive coefficient 
attached to the interaction between training and upper-intermediate skill groups (see 
column 6 in table 4.7a). This suggests that training may enhance the productivity benefits 
in those industries or countries with a larger proportion of upper-intermediate workers. For 
example, in an industry x where the average percentage of workers with upper-
intermediate qualifications is 12%, a 10% increase in training would result in a productivity 
increase of 3.6%50.  
50 See coefficients of training variables  in column (6)  of  table  4.7a The computation of the marginal 
effect is 0.338+(0.181*0.12)=0.36 
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 A caveat of this measure of training is that it ignores the fact that training is not usually 
distributed uniformly across all types of workers, and evidence suggest that the most 
highly skilled workers are the ones usually receiving this type of employer-provided 
training. In a related paper Mason et al. (2014) also investigate the effect of combining 
certified skills with training capital stocks by means of interaction terms in the regressions, 
although the measure of training capital stock is slightly different.  They obtain estimates of 
intangible training capital not only for the whole workforce, but also for each separate skill 
group, which clearly show that the higher-educated tend to receive more job-related 
training than the lower-educated in most countries. 
Mason et al. (2014) show that there are differences in the way various types of skills affect 
productivity. They find considerable evidence of a positive relationship between upper-
intermediate vocational skills and relative labour productivity performance; they also find 
this relationship is stronger when vocational skills are broadly defined to include uncertified 
skills acquired through employer-provided training. This positive relationship, however, is 
found primarily in those countries where Vocational and Educational Training (VET) is 
apprenticeship-based. The sample of countries included in the Mason et al.'s study is quite 
close to ours; the main difference is that we have Finland in our sample and they have 
Denmark.  
Mason et al. (2014) also found positive effects of combining ICT use with high-level 
academic skills, and also with lower-intermediate general skills (in the present cross-
country analysis, however, we cannot distinguish lower-intermediate general from lower-
intermediate vocational skills).  
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 Table 4.7a. Panel models with interaction terms and additional inputs; Estimation in 
levels, 1995-2010. 
 (1) (OLS) 
(2) 
(RE) 
(3) 
(FE) 
(4) 
(RE) 
(5) 
(RE) 
(6) 
(RE) 
ICT capital per employee 0.018 0.147** 0.144** 0.120** 0.142*** 0.149*** 
 (0.043) (0.058) (0.054) (0.058) (0.055) (0.052) 
Non-ICT capital per 
employee 0.148*** 0.196*** 0.176 0.194*** 0.197*** 0.198*** 
 (0.019) (0.070) (0.109) (0.071) (0.070) (0.070) 
Training per employee 0.644*** 0.323*** 0.203** 0.305*** 0.347** 0.338** 
 (0.069) (0.124) (0.095) (0.117) (0.154) (0.148) 
% High skills 3.433*** 0.231* 0.123 0.284** 0.227* 0.231* 
 (0.548) (0.129) (0.122) (0.125) (0.125) (0.133) 
% Upper intermediate 
skills 2.148*** 0.358 0.181 0.330 0.369 0.372 
 (0.638) (0.299) (0.270) (0.286) (0.315) (0.319) 
% Low skills -0.437 -0.233* -0.130 -0.216* -0.228* -0.200* 
 (0.272) (0.120) (0.120) (0.125) (0.117) (0.118) 
ICT capital per employee 
*High skills    0.013   
    (0.078)   
ICT capital per employee 
*Upper-intermediate skills    0.198   
    (0.134)   
Training capital* ICT 
capital per employee    -0.011  -0.005 
    (0.028)  (0.026) 
Training capital* High 
skills      -0.070 
      (0.093) 
Training capital* Upper-
intermediate skills      0.181* 
      (0.093) 
Country-year FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry-year 
FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R2 within  0.734 0.740 0.745 0.734 0.741 
R2 between  0.919 0.477 0.918 0.921 0.923 
R2 overall  0.918 0.481 0.917 0.919 0.922 
Groups 40 40 40 40 40 40 
Obs. 419 419 419 419 419 419 
 
Note: OLS= Ordinary Least Squares; RE=Random Effects, FE=Fixed effects.  
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 Table 4.7b below reports the results of a regression specification that contains more 
detailed interactions amongst the explanatory variables. First of all,  ICT capital and non-
ICT capital are interacted with the skills and training measures; we thus aim to uncover 
complementarities between different types of capital and our measures of usage of skills 
and training stock. In addition we include other measures of intangible capital that may be 
important in explaining productivity outcomes.  
The estimated coefficients for ICT capital and non-ICT capital deepening are again in line 
with prior evidence. The coefficient on training capital per employee is estimated to be 
around 0.2. When we interact the skill variables with a larger number of variables, the 
coefficients of different skills categories are no longer significant. However, some 
interesting results emerge. We find a positive and significant coefficient for the high-skill 
variable when we interact it with the ICT capital. This effect is also found in Mason et al. 
(2014)'s study.  
This result suggests that high-level academic skills have a larger influence on 
productivity outcomes in industries with higher ICT intensity. Alternatively, we can 
interpret this result by saying that for firms to increase the returns to ICT investment it is 
necessary to invest in additional assets e.g. having a highly qualified workforce. This 
result, which points to larger complementarities between ICT capital and high-level 
academic skills, is consistent with recent evidence looking more broadly at the 
complementarities between ICT capital and several forms of intangible capital. 
The results also show that the prevalence of upper-intermediate skills has a 
stronger influence on productivity in those sectors with a higher intensity of non-
ICT capital. Here we also find that training capital has a larger effect on productivity in 
those industries with a larger endowment of workers with upper-intermediate skills (e.g. 
high level technicians). Finally, we add interactions between skills variables and other 
alternative measures of intangible investments. Corrado et et al. (2014) find that 
investments in non-R&D intangibles play a significant role in economic growth. Our 
intangible indicators are based on the Intan-Invest database. Here we measure intangible 
investment as a share of output, as building capital stocks for these assets is beyond the 
scope of this research. Three broad categories are considered here: software, innovative 
property and economic competencies. The most interesting finding refers to the innovative 
property investment  category (which comprises mineral exploration, scientific R&D, 
entertainment and artistic originals, new product/systems in financial systems; designs and 
other product/systems). High-level academic skills have a larger positive influence on 
productivity in those industries where innovative property investment represents a 
higher share of output. In these industries, the upper-intermediate skills also have a 
positive contribution to productivity, but this is of lower magnitude than in the case 
of high-skills, in line with expectations. Results on software are not statistically 
significant, but this is of less importance, as software is one of the assets included in the 
ICT category.  
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 Table 4.7b. Panel models with interaction terms and additional inputs; Estimation in 
levels, Random-Effects models, 1995-2010. 
Dependent: Output per unit of labour (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
ICT capital per employee 0.052 0.137*** 0.138*** 0.163** 
 (0.079) (0.048) (0.046) (0.065) 
Non-ICT capital per employee 0.206** 0.187** 0.192*** 0.221*** 
 (0.097) (0.077) (0.072) (0.077) 
Training per employee  0.217** 0.239**  
  (0.09) (0.097)  
%High skills 0.169 0.135  0.286 
 (0.431) (0.181)  (0.34) 
%Upper-intermediate skills -0.628** 0.209  -0.309 
 (0.273) (0.283)  (0.556) 
ICT capital per employee*% High skill 0.166*    
 (0.098)    
ICT capital per employee*Upper-int.skill 0.141    
 (0.096)    
Non-ICT capital per employee*High skill -0.064    
 (0.069)    
Non-ICT capital/employee*Upper-
int.skill 0.134*** 
   
 (0.049)    
Training per employee* High skill   -0.007  
   (0.096)  
Training per employee* Upper-int.skill   0.182**  
   (0.09)  
R&D share output    5.521 
    (4.839) 
Soft share output    -5.206 
    (4.851) 
IP51share output    -4.367* 
    (2.589) 
R&D share output*%High skills    -8.041 
    (12.418) 
R&D share output*%Upper-int. skills    2.74 
    (13.004) 
IP share output*%High skills    11.429** 
    (5.086) 
IP share output*% Upper-int. skills    5.387* 
    (3.03) 
51 Innovative Property(IP) assets: R&D, design; product development in financial services; mineral 
exploration and spending on the production of artistic originals. 
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 Country-year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 459 459 459 459 
 
5. Key Findings 
• Between the mid-1990s and 2007, the increasing endowments of ICT capital, up-
skilling of the workforce, and rapid total factor productivity growth spurred labour 
productivity growth in the UK; as a result of these factors, UK labour productivity 
narrowed the gap with respect to leading economies. 
• Since the financial crisis productivity growth has slowed down in the UK to a larger 
extent than in other major economies, such as US, Germany and France, and the 
productivity gap appears to be widening again.  
• Total factor productivity growth, which has now been negative for a few years, 
accounts for a substantial part of the labour productivity deterioration in the UK, 
compared to other advanced economies.  
• We do not find evidence that changes in the aggregate level of skills have had a 
negative impact on UK productivity. On the contrary, as the UK’s workforce 
becomes better qualified, the improvement in workforce skills emerges as one of 
the main factors currently boosting productivity in the UK.  Throughout  both the 
period of economic weakness, and subsequent recovery, skills have continued to 
play an important role for productivity. This is one of the key findings of this study. 
• Our results thus do not support the supply-side theory that the productivity puzzle is 
associated with a structural shift in the workforce towards less productive workers. 
Recent research  shows that even when accounting for a greater presence of 
potentially less-productive workers, such as self-employed and part-time workers, 
can explain only a small fraction of the productivity puzzle (Dolphin and Hatfield, 
2015).  
• Understanding the influence of different types of skills on output and productivity is 
one of the main issues addressed by this study and an issue that has been little 
explored to date, particularly from a comparative point of view. 
• We find that the measured contribution of high-level academic skills to aggregate 
growth is on the rise; this can be explained by the rapid increase in the proportion of 
workers holding university degrees, and a drop in those with low-level or no 
academic qualifications. This is observed at a more rapid pace in the UK than in 
other competitor economies. 
• Against this, those type of qualifications with a more technical and vocational focus, 
appear to be losing ground in the UK; this is the case for both upper-intermediate 
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 and lower-intermediate vocational qualifications which  traditionally have been less 
intensively used in the UK than in Continental European countries.  
• The incidence of other types of uncertified skills, represented here by employer-
provided training, has worsened in the UK. This trend, however, cannot fully be 
linked to spending cuts during the recession, as training has been declining in the 
UK at least for a decade. This is not much different to what has been observed in 
other European countries (e.g. France).   
• Our econometric exercise has found evidence that the higher the share of workers 
in a particular country or industry with tertiary studies, the higher its productivity 
performance on average. We employ a classic production function framework and 
data for different industries, countries and periods of time, which includes the post-
recession years.   
• The econometric framework also allows us to explore the existence of indirect 
productivity effects, for example the existence of complementarities amongst 
different production inputs; we find that the returns associated with ICT investments 
are likely to be larger in those countries and/or industries with a higher endowment 
of university graduates.  
• Our results point to the existence of additional productivity gains associated with 
having a trained workforce. In addition to the more established relationship between 
high-skills and the ICT capital, we find evidence of positive productivity 
complementarities between high-level vocational qualifications and other types of 
intangible assets.   
• In particular, we find evidence that on-the-job training yields additional returns in 
those countries and/or industries with larger pool of workers with upper-intermediate 
qualifications. This finding highlights the importance of training workers for 
achieving sustained productivity in the knowledge economy.  
6. Conclusions  
Over the past decades most countries have experienced a remarkable expansion of their 
education and skill base. In the UK, the improvement in workforce skills contributed to one-
fifth of UK's annual labour productivity growth in the late 1990s and early 2000s. During 
this expansionary period, the number of UK workers with high-level academic degrees 
increased at a faster rate in the UK than in other major countries. The widespread diffusion 
of ICTs along with the surge in complementary investments are believed to have played a 
major part in the realisation of large productivity gains.  While this phenomenon was 
observed a little later in the UK than in the US and other countries at frontier of the ICT 
revolution,  the productivity growth rates achieved in the UK exceeded those in many other 
economies before the onset of recession. As a result, during this period the long-standing 
productivity gap of the UK relative to major European countries was narrowed significantly. 
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 Since the global financial crisis, however, this pattern of convergence  has come to a halt. 
European countries have suffered a major productivity slowdown, in contrast with the more 
stable productivity record of the US. The declining productivity in the UK seems of 
particular concern and has highlighted the existence of structural productivity problems, as 
well as potential measurement issues.  
Despite the aggregate disappointing productivity performance, the on-going improvement 
in the level of education of the UK's workforce is a significant finding. Skills have continue 
to foster productivity growth throughout the different phases of the economic cycle. The 
contribution rose sharply during the first years of the recession and stands  currently at 
levels similar to the pre-crisis period. 
  
The contributions made by different types of qualifications are also evolving. High-skilled 
workers make the largest contribution to labour productivity growth and this trend is on the 
rise. These developments resemble those observed in the other major developed 
economies, such as the US and France. Possibly related to the increase in the supply of 
highly qualified workers, we have also seen small decreases in the relative graduate wage 
premiums. This is consistent with the fact that slightly more graduates may be taking on 
roles with lesser qualification requirements.  
 
Over the past few years, there has been significantly more research devoted to the study 
of the relationship between graduate qualifications and economies' aggregate growth 
outcomes. However, the role of less academic type of skills in raising productivity has 
traditionally been overlooked. In this study, we go a step beyond this and distinguish the 
contribution of vocational qualifications from other qualifications. In particular we show 
here that the aggregate contribution of upper-intermediate vocational skills continues to 
deteriorate in the UK, compared with other countries where the demand for this type of 
qualifications has traditionally been higher than in the UK.  
 
Using a range of econometric analysis techniques we also find, in line with prior 
expectations, evidence of a positive link between high skills and productivity outcomes.  In 
addition to this link, we find evidence of lesser known complementarities between a wider 
range of skills and  intangible assets.  Recent studies show that much of the empirical 
evidence on the complementarities between skills, ICTs and innovation emphasizes the 
role of high-level skills (e,g of university graduates) rather than intermediate vocational 
skills (technicians, craft workers and other employees with qualifications below university 
graduate level). However, intermediate vocational skills can also contribute to the effective 
use of these technologies by helping to enhance the absorptive capacity which firms 
require to make effective use of knowledge, ideas and technologies generated outside 
their own organizations (Mason et al., 2014). 
 
Overall the econometric results suggest that having a highly skilled workforce (either with 
degree level or upper intermediate qualifications) is important when combined with 
investment in intangible assets such as training and innovative property. This is consistent 
with the idea that the use of information technology, which increasingly is associated with 
complementary investments in intangible assets, is relatively skill intensive. Our results 
suggest that the skill bias of new technology carries over to the period directly following the 
crisis. However the small sample sizes warn against drawing too firm conclusions and 
further work is required, especially including the recovery period.  
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 Figure A.2.1. Labour productivity levels (GDP per person), 1995-2013. 
 
Source: The Conference Board Total Economy Database (Updated Jan 2014). Note that the 2015 Annual Release of the Total Economy Database was only 
released in April 2015).  
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 Table A.2.1. GDP per person, Average growth rates by sub-period, 1995-2013.  
  1995-
2002 
2003-
2007 
2008-
2010 
2011-
2013 
United Kingdom 2.1% 2.3% -1.2% 0.1% 
France 0.9% 1.3% -0.3% 0.5% 
Germany 1.0% 1.4% -0.7% 0.6% 
Netherlands 1.0% 1.7% -0.3% -0.1% 
Sweden 2.1% 2.8% 0.4% 0.7% 
Finland 2.0% 2.5% -1.7% 0.3% 
United States 2.3% 1.5% 1.4% 1.0% 
 
 
Source: The Conference Board Total Economy Database (Updated Jan 2014); own calculations.  
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 APPENDIX  
Table A.2.2 Annual employment shares, EU LFS micro-files (Eurostat, April 
2015) and US Current Population Survey (weighted figures).  
Year Country High Upper-
intermediate 
Lower-
intermediate 
Low 
2001 DE 0.15 0.16 0.52 0.17 
2002 DE 0.15 0.17 0.52 0.16 
2003 DE 0.16 0.17 0.52 0.16 
2004 DE 0.16 0.18 0.51 0.15 
2005 DE 0.16 0.17 0.51 0.16 
2006 DE 0.16 0.16 0.52 0.16 
2007 DE 0.17 0.17 0.51 0.16 
2008 DE 0.18 0.17 0.51 0.15 
2009 DE 0.18 0.17 0.50 0.15 
2010 DE 0.18 0.18 0.50 0.14 
2011 DE 0.17 0.20 0.49 0.14 
2012 DE 0.18 0.20 0.49 0.14 
2013 DE 0.19 0.19 0.49 0.13 
2003 FI 0.17 0.17 0.45 0.21 
2004 FI 0.18 0.17 0.46 0.19 
2005 FI 0.18 0.17 0.47 0.18 
2006 FI 0.20 0.16 0.46 0.18 
2007 FI 0.21 0.15 0.47 0.17 
2008 FI 0.23 0.15 0.46 0.17 
2009 FI 0.24 0.15 0.46 0.15 
2010 FI 0.24 0.15 0.46 0.15 
2011 FI 0.26 0.15 0.45 0.14 
2012 FI 0.27 0.15 0.45 0.13 
2013 FI 0.28 0.13 0.46 0.13 
2001 FR 0.15 0.12 0.13 0.60 
2002 FR 0.15 0.12 0.14 0.59 
2003 FR 0.16 0.11 0.14 0.59 
2004 FR 0.16 0.12 0.14 0.58 
2005 FR 0.17 0.12 0.15 0.56 
2006 FR 0.17 0.13 0.16 0.55 
2007 FR 0.18 0.13 0.16 0.54 
2008 FR 0.18 0.13 0.17 0.52 
2009 FR 0.19 0.14 0.17 0.51 
2010 FR 0.20 0.13 0.17 0.50 
2011 FR 0.20 0.14 0.18 0.48 
2012 FR 0.21 0.14 0.18 0.47 
2013 FR 0.22 0.15 0.17 0.46 
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 Year Country High Upper-
intermediate 
Lower-
intermediate 
Low 
2001 NL 0.22 0.08 0.21 0.50 
2002 NL 0.22 0.08 0.21 0.49 
2003 NL 0.25 0.07 0.23 0.46 
2004 NL 0.27 0.06 0.25 0.42 
2005 NL 0.29 0.05 0.26 0.40 
2006 NL 0.28 0.05 0.25 0.42 
2007 NL 0.29 0.05 0.26 0.41 
2008 NL 0.29 0.06 0.25 0.41 
2009 NL 0.30 0.05 0.25 0.40 
2010 NL 0.30 0.05 0.26 0.38 
2011 NL 0.30 0.05 0.26 0.38 
2012 NL 0.31 0.05 0.26 0.38 
2013 NL 0.32 0.03 0.24 0.41 
2006 SE 0.22 0.15 0.23 0.41 
2007 SE 0.22 0.15 0.23 0.39 
2008 SE 0.23 0.15 0.24 0.38 
2009 SE 0.24 0.15 0.24 0.36 
2010 SE 0.25 0.15 0.24 0.35 
2011 SE 0.26 0.16 0.25 0.34 
2012 SE 0.26 0.16 0.24 0.33 
2013 SE 0.28 0.17 0.25 0.31 
2001 UK 0.20 0.09 0.18 0.52 
2002 UK 0.21 0.09 0.19 0.50 
2003 UK 0.22 0.10 0.20 0.49 
2004 UK 0.23 0.10 0.19 0.49 
2005 UK 0.23 0.10 0.20 0.47 
2006 UK 0.25 0.10 0.20 0.46 
2007 UK 0.26 0.10 0.20 0.44 
2008 UK 0.26 0.09 0.19 0.46 
2009 UK 0.28 0.10 0.19 0.43 
2010 UK 0.29 0.10 0.19 0.42 
2011 UK 0.25 0.16 0.19 0.40 
2012 UK 0.26 0.16 0.20 0.38 
2013 UK 0.27 0.16 0.19 0.38 
1999 US 0.27 0.18 0.42 0.13 
2000 US 0.28 0.19 0.41 0.13 
2001 US 0.28 0.19 0.41 0.12 
2002 US 0.29 0.19 0.40 0.12 
2003 US 0.29 0.19 0.40 0.12 
2004 US 0.30 0.19 0.40 0.12 
2005 US 0.30 0.19 0.39 0.12 
2006 US 0.30 0.19 0.39 0.12 
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 Year Country High Upper-
intermediate 
Lower-
intermediate 
Low 
2007 US 0.31 0.19 0.39 0.11 
2008 US 0.32 0.19 0.38 0.10 
2009 US 0.33 0.20 0.38 0.10 
2010 US 0.33 0.20 0.38 0.09 
2011 US 0.34 0.20 0.37 0.09 
2012 US 0.34 0.20 0.37 0.09 
2013 US 0.35 0.20 0.36 0.09 
 
Note: DE=Germany, FI=Finland, FR=France, NL=Netherlands, SE=Sweden, UK=United Kingdom, 
US=United States. 
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 Table A.2.3. Annual employment shares, Five groups, UK Labour Force Survey 
(population-weighted figures), 2001-2013. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Year Graduates Upper-
intermediate 
Lower- 
intermediate 
vocational 
Lower- 
intermediate 
general 
Low-
skilled 
2001 0.21 0.11 0.16 0.09 0.43 
2002 0.21 0.11 0.17 0.10 0.42 
2003 0.22 0.12 0.16 0.09 0.41 
2004 0.23 0.11 0.15 0.10 0.40 
2005 0.25 0.11 0.16 0.10 0.39 
2006 0.26 0.11 0.15 0.09 0.39 
2007 0.26 0.12 0.16 0.10 0.37 
2008 0.27 0.11 0.15 0.10 0.37 
2009 0.29 0.12 0.16 0.09 0.35 
2010 0.30 0.12 0.16 0.09 0.33 
2011 0.30 0.11 0.16 0.10 0.33 
2012 0.33 0.11 0.15 0.09 0.31 
2013 0.34 0.11 0.15 0.10 0.30 
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 Table A.2.4. UK Average gross hourly earnings (£), UK Labour Force Survey 
(weighted figures), 2001-2013. 
  Graduates Upper 
intermediate 
Lower 
intermediate 
vocational 
Lower 
intermediate 
general 
Low-skilled 
2001 14.68 11.26 8.52 9.03 6.98 
2002 15.12 11.25 8.70 9.12 7.24 
2003 15.66 11.50 8.94 9.34 7.39 
2004 15.55 11.86 9.41 9.62 7.66 
2005 15.99 12.22 9.64 9.94 8.15 
2006 16.69 12.39 9.93 10.21 8.37 
2007 16.88 12.89 10.29 10.43 8.70 
2008 17.53 13.70 10.72 10.66 9.22 
2009 17.96 13.58 10.74 11.07 9.12 
2010 17.99 13.74 10.74 10.93 9.25 
2011 17.85 13.76 10.82 11.32 9.33 
2012 18.05 13.86 11.01 11.70 9.45 
2013 18.06 13.81 10.58 11.59 9.51 
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 Figure A.2.2. Average hourly earnings in France, by skill group, Structure of 
Earnings Survey. 
 
Source: Structure of Earnings Survey, Eurostat.  
Figure A.2.3. Average hourly earnings in Germany, by skill group, Structure of 
Earnings Survey. 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel, Structure of Earnings Survey (2006), own calculations. 
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 Figure A.2.4. Average hourly earnings in Finland, by skill group, Structure of 
Earnings Survey. 
 
Source: Structure of Earnings Survey. 
Figure A.2.5. Average hourly earnings in Netherlands, by skill group, Structure 
of Earnings Survey. 
 
Source: Structure of Earnings Survey 
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 Figure A.2.6. Average hourly earnings in Sweden, by skill group, Structure of 
Earnings Survey. 
 
Source: Structure of Earnings Survey 
Figure A.2.7.  Average hourly earnings in the US, by skill group.  
Source: Current Population Survey. 
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 Table A.2.5 Average hourly earnings, Structure of Earnings Survey, UK Labour 
Force Survey and US Current Population Survey (weighted figures)52. 
Year country High-skilled Upper-
intermediate 
Lower-
intermediate 
Low-skilled 
2002 DE 24.48 18.90 15.00 9.83 
2003 DE 26.23 19.83 15.73 10.52 
2004 DE 26.45 20.34 16.14 9.92 
2005 DE 26.37 20.24 16.06 10.35 
2006 DE 27.02 19.90 15.79 10.13 
2007 DE 26.92 19.49 15.47 10.24 
2008 DE 27.00 19.73 15.66 10.12 
2009 DE 27.01 19.89 15.78 9.82 
2002 FI 19.79 14.71 12.75 12.19 
2003 FI 20.03 14.99 12.93 12.46 
2004 FI 20.28 15.26 13.12 12.73 
2005 FI 20.52 15.54 13.30 13.00 
2006 FI 20.76 15.81 13.49 13.27 
2007 FI 21.42 16.46 13.97 13.98 
2008 FI 22.07 17.10 14.44 14.69 
2009 FI 22.73 17.74 14.92 15.40 
2010 FI 23.39 18.39 15.40 16.11 
2002 FR 29.69 18.65 14.46 12.55 
2003 FR 28.69 18.67 14.94 12.96 
2004 FR 27.70 18.70 15.41 13.38 
2005 FR 26.71 18.72 15.89 13.80 
2006 FR 25.71 18.75 16.36 14.22 
2007 FR 25.47 18.56 16.10 14.07 
2008 FR 25.23 18.37 15.83 13.92 
2009 FR 24.99 18.18 15.56 13.77 
2010 FR 24.75 17.99 15.29 13.63 
2002 NL 21.56 18.02 14.57 11.09 
2003 NL 21.46 18.67 14.55 11.05 
2004 NL 21.36 19.31 14.52 11.02 
2005 NL 21.27 19.96 14.50 10.99 
2006 NL 21.17 20.61 14.47 10.96 
2007 NL 22.03 21.16 14.91 11.31 
2008 NL 22.88 21.72 15.35 11.66 
2009 NL 23.74 22.27 15.78 12.01 
2010 NL 24.59 22.82 16.22 12.37 
2001 SE 206.88 159.36 127.84 116.90 
52 The Structure of Earnings Survey covers the years 2002, 2006 and 2010. For the years in between, 
linear interpolation has been assumed.  
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 Year country High-skilled Upper-
intermediate 
Lower-
intermediate 
Low-skilled 
2002 SE 206.88 159.36 127.84 116.90 
2003 SE 197.87 160.97 129.29 119.46 
2004 SE 188.86 162.57 130.73 122.01 
2005 SE 179.85 164.17 132.17 124.57 
2006 SE 170.84 165.78 133.61 127.13 
2007 SE 176.13 164.87 139.15 131.59 
2008 SE 181.42 163.96 144.69 136.05 
2009 SE 186.72 163.06 150.23 140.52 
2010 SE 192.01 162.15 155.77 144.98 
2001 UK 14.68 11.26 8.70 6.98 
2002 UK 15.12 11.25 8.85 7.24 
2003 UK 15.66 11.50 9.09 7.39 
2004 UK 15.55 11.86 9.49 7.66 
2005 UK 15.99 12.22 9.75 8.15 
2006 UK 16.69 12.39 10.04 8.37 
2007 UK 16.88 12.89 10.35 8.70 
2008 UK 17.53 13.70 10.70 9.22 
2009 UK 17.96 13.58 10.87 9.12 
2010 UK 17.99 13.74 10.81 9.25 
2011 UK 17.85 13.76 11.01 9.33 
2012 UK 18.05 13.86 11.28 9.45 
2013 UK 18.06 13.81 10.97 9.51 
2001 US 26.59 17.23 14.38 9.81 
2002 US 26.93 17.56 14.60 9.99 
2003 US 26.81 17.63 14.62 10.09 
2004 US 26.88 17.53 14.49 9.96 
2005 US 26.88 17.26 14.41 9.90 
2006 US 26.71 17.19 14.36 9.93 
2007 US 27.12 17.49 14.42 10.11 
2008 US 26.90 17.40 14.38 10.12 
2009 US 27.10 17.68 14.59 10.34 
2010 US 27.06 17.38 14.43 10.02 
2011 US 26.75 17.07 14.22 10.14 
2012 US 26.79 16.92 14.00 10.04 
2013 US 26.76 16.68 13.96 10.00 
 
Note: Average hourly earnings given in national currency. Euro/Hour for France (FR), Finland (FI), 
and Netherlands (NL); Pound/hour for United Kingdom(UK); Swedish Krona/Hour for Sweden (SE); 
Dollar/Hour for the United States (US); Wages for Germany only available up to 2009.
109 
 Table A.2.6. Growth accounting decomposition, 2002-2013 (three sub-periods). 
  United Kingdom France Germany Netherlands Sweden Finland United States 
GDP growth                
2002-2007 3.09 1.81 1.39 1.97 3.26 4.11 2.66 
2008-2010 -1.48 -0.52 -0.09 -0.14 0.19 -1.77 -0.22 
2011-2013 0.86 0.74 1.45 -0.27 1.78 0.72 2.16 
                
Contribution L quantity (%)               
2002-2007 0.39 0.20 -0.15 0.13 1.96 0.79 0.57 
2008-2010 -0.45 -0.23 0.12 -0.05 0.18 -0.43 -1.14 
2011-2013 0.73 0.09 0.36 0.16 0.37 0.09 0.83 
                
Contribution L Composition (%)               
2002-2007 0.47 0.32 0.15 0.51 0.19 0.29 0.27 
2008-2010 0.62 0.36 0.36 0.30 0.20 0.28 0.40 
2011-2013 0.47 0.36 0.22 -0.20 0.19 0.30 0.25 
                
Contribution ICT Capital (%)               
2002-2007 0.47 0.19 0.29 0.30 0.62 0.55 0.43 
2008-2010 0.14 0.09 0.33 0.19 0.49 0.44 0.36 
2011-2013 0.31 0.19 0.52 0.23 0.66 0.36 0.37 
                
Contribution Non-ICT Capital (%)               
2002-2007 0.71 0.77 0.21 0.28 0.93 0.23 0.62 
2008-2010 0.70 0.71 0.21 0.35 0.63 0.37 0.31 
2011-2013 0.36 0.54 0.12 0.18 0.46 0.15 0.24 
                
Training(%)               
2002-2007 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.15 -0.08 0.08 . 
2008-2010 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.06 -0.05 0.04 . 
2011-2013 -0.10 -0.02 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.06 . 
                
TFP (%)                
2002-2007 0.98 0.25 0.85 0.60 -0.35 2.18 0.78 
2008-2010 -2.51 -1.44 -1.12 -1.00 -1.25 -2.47 -0.14 
2011-2013 -0.91 -0.41 0.22 -0.68 0.10 -0.25 0.46 
 
Source: Conference Board's TED, UKLFS, EU LFS, own calculations. 
110 
 Figure A.2.8. Growth contributions of labour, capital and productivity in United 
States (%), 1995-2013.  
 
Source, TED, Current Population Survey, own calculations. 
Figure A.2.9. Growth contributions of labour, capital and productivity in France (%), 
1995-2013.  
 
Source, TED, EU LFS, SES, own calculations. 
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 Figure A.2.10. Growth contributions of labour, capital and productivity in Germany 
(%), 1995-2013.  
 
Source, TED,EU LFS, SES, own calculations. 
Figure A.2.11. Growth contributions of labour, capital and productivity in Finland 
(%), 1995-2013.  
 
Source, TED,EU LFS, SES, own calculations. 
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 Figure A.2.12. Growth contributions of labour, capital and productivity in 
Netherlands (%), 1995-2013.  
 
Source, TED,EU LFS, SES, own calculations. 
Figure A.2.13. Growth contributions of labour, capital and productivity in Sweden 
(%), 1995-2013.  
 
Source, TED, EU LFS, SES, own calculations. 
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 Industries definition (NACE Rev. 2) 
A  Agriculture, forestry and fishing 
B Mining and quarrying 
C     Manufacturing 
D  Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 
E  Water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation activities 
F  Construction 
G  Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles. 
I  Accommodation and food service activities 
H Transportation and storage 
J  Information and communication 
K  Finance and insurance activities 
L  Real estate activities 
M  Professional, scientific and technical activities 
N Administrative and support service activities 
O Public administration and defence, compulsory social security 
P  Education 
Q  Human health and social work activities 
R  Arts, entertainment and recreation 
S Other service activities 
T Activities of households as employers, undifferentiated goods and services-
 producing  activities of households for own use.  
U Activities of extra-territorial organisations and bodies. 
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